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Chapter 1
12
Have you ever wondered how you acquired the vast amount 
of knowledge and skills you are equipped with today? In this 
complex and changing world, how did you build up knowledge 
that is useful to guide your actions for the future? Of course, 
there is no single answer to these questions. Nevertheless, one 
thing is certain: You learned many things and gradually built 
knowledge, and perhaps still learning every day. 
In this thesis, I investigated how young children learn 
about the structure of the world to guide their actions. 
In particular, I examined how they update their existing 
internal models in response to changes in the environment 
and how they revise their world models if these models no 
longer represent the outside world accurately. As the models 
were revised, different from model updating, the structure 
of the models changed (e.g. new variables were added to the 
models). Across several ages, I investigated the developmental 
differences in model updating and revision processes. Using a 
Bayesian framework, I proposed an explanation of how young 
learners adjust their internal models of the environment 
as they acquire new information to maintain an accurate 
representation of the outside world.
13
General Introduction
The Bayesian framework
Now, let’s play a game. After reading this paragraph, close this 
book, hold it horizontally in your view and guess how many 
pages there are in this book. Well, without looking at the 
page numbers, of course! If you are reading these pages on an 
electronic device, look at the relation between the rod on the 
right and the size of the screen. Please return once you made 
a guess. There is a lot more to read! OK, go ahead!
What is your guess? Well, we all know that in reality 
the number of pages in this book is certain and has only 
one value. However, when you make a guess, it would be 
reasonable to take into account a range of possible options 
and give an estimate between, say 200 and 300. One of the 
key features of the Bayesian approach is that your beliefs 
about environmental properties (e.g. the number of pages in 
the book) are represented as probability distributions over 
possible states. In Bayesian terms, this is called probability 
density functions.
Because your degree of belief is represented in 
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probabilistic terms, it is possible to estimate an average 
value and perhaps, more interestingly, the confidence in 
your estimation by taking into account the variance of the 
probability density functions. The level of confidence in your 
estimation represents another key concept in the Bayesian 
framework: uncertainty about environmental states. 
If you have not checked it already, there will be some 
doubt embedded in your answer. Hang in there! Consider 
that you have received information from two sources: you 
used your vision to see and you received tactile information, 
for example, you held the book in between your fingers and 
felt how thick it is. These are observations or current evidence.
Now, one fair question would be how reliable your 
observations are. Let’s assume that you have corrected vision 
and today you lost your glasses. How much confidence would 
you have in what you have seen? One other key feature in the 
Bayesian formalization is precision weighting, that is, giving 
more weight to information that is less uncertain. If you 
would want to make use of several sources of information and 
do not want to waste any piece, the most reasonable strategy 
would be to weigh them considering how much uncertainty 
is associated to each and combine both sources to make use of 
available information maximally. 
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There is even more to help you with your guess. It 
could be that you have seen many PhD theses in your life, 
and perhaps you have an idea about of how many pages a 
PhD thesis usually consists. One of the distinctive features of 
the Bayesian framework is that your previous beliefs, called 
priors, likewise represented in probabilistic terms, are taken 
into account while making estimations. To make a guess, you 
can combine your current observations and prior beliefs, 
which gives you a posterior distribution.  The Bayes’ rule is 
that your belief about the state of the outside world after the 
current observation, namely the posterior, is proportional to 
your previous beliefs weighted by incoming evidence (The 
total number of pages is 273 by the way).
The Bayesian framework allows us to model the 
structure of the world and explain how we make inferences 
in the face of uncertainty. Emerging evidence shows that 
individuals integrate information according to a Bayes’ rule 
and the Bayesian models explain human brain function and 
behavior. The Bayesian principles have been used to formalize 
several phenomena, among others, motor control (Körding 
& Wolpert, 2006), visual perception (Yuille & Kersten, 2006), 
causal inference (Steyvers, Tenenbaum, Wagenmakers, 
& Blum, 2003), action understanding (Baker, Saxe, & 
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Tenenbaum, 2009), developmental plasticity and change 
(Stamps & Frankenhuis, 2016), language acquisition (Pearl 
& Goldwater, 2016), and social learning (Mossel, Olsman, 
& Tamuz, 2016). In the following section, I will focus on 
learning and describe how the Bayesian framework formalizes 
learning. By giving examples from empirical studies, I will 
provide an overview of how the Bayesian framework has been 
applied to explain learning in humans and animals.
Bayesian Learning
The Bayesian framework proposes an explanation on how 
individuals update their internal models of the environment, 
which are generated through learning processes, by providing 
a formal description of how we integrate current observations 
with prior experiences. Within the Bayesian perspective, 
learning is defined as updating of beliefs as new information is 
obtained. This formalization of learning is particularly helpful 
in explaining how beliefs evolve over time in situations where 
information is acquired in a consecutive manner (O’Reilly 
& Mars, 2015). That is, each time new evidence is received, 
the prior is updated to a new posterior, which becomes a new 
prior for making inferences when next evidence is observed. 
One interesting line of work in the Bayesian 
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formalization of human and animal learning is the statistical 
challenge that arises when a change occurs in the environment. 
Based on animal experiments, Courville, Daw, and Touretsky 
(2006) argue that information that is not expected given one’s 
model would signal change, which often makes one’s previous 
models of the environment obsolete. This would call for an 
updating of the internal models, thus foster learning, in order 
to maintain an accurate representation of the outside world. 
Building on this work, O’Reilly and colleagues (2013) 
investigated how humans update their internal models in a 
changing environment and whether a normative Bayesian 
learner model could explain this process. Using fMRI and 
a saccadic planning paradigm, they presented adults with 
targets that changed location in every few trials. The first 
trial in which the targets appeared at a new location were 
called “update trials”.  After “update” trials, the targets 
continued to appear around the same area for a couple of 
trials (i.e. expected trials). In some of the trials, the targets 
appeared at a new location over the circle for once (i.e. one-
off trials); however, in the following trials the targets appeared 
around the same area as in the immediately preceding trials. 
Although the sudden appearances of the targets at new 
locations were unexpected in both trials, participants were 
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required to update their models in the update trials, but not 
in one-off trials, as the targets continued to appear at this new 
location only after the update trials. Data revealed activation 
in the parietal cortex when an immediate motor response was 
programmed as the location of the targets were unexpectedly 
changed in both trial types. However, the anterior cingulate 
cortex was specifically active only when participants updated 
their internal models to accommodate the information about 
the new location of the targets. In summary, these findings 
show that when the uncertainty about the parameters of the 
environment increases, adults adjust their internal models to 
represent the statistics of the outside world accurately. 
Early childhood is a period during which children go 
through rapid developmental changes both physically and 
mentally. Because their world knowledge and experiences are 
limited as compared to adults, this phase might be associated 
with more uncertainty about the structure of the world. In the 
following section, I will have a closer look at early childhood 
and outline how cognitive development might be explained by 
the Bayesian principles. First, I will describe how the Bayesian 
framework has provided a new approach to the long-lasting 
debates in the field (i.e. nativism vs. empiricism). Next, I 
will give examples from developmental studies showing that 
19
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young children can perform the basic computations that are 
assumed by the Bayesian framework. In the final part of this 
section, I will focus on Bayesian learning in development 
and describe how the Bayesian framework has been used to 
explain early learning and cognitive change in development.
The Bayesian framework in 
development
The initial knowledge state of early learners and the 
mechanisms that bring about conceptual growth have been 
subject to longstanding debates in cognitive development 
(Denison & Xu, 2012). Nativists advocate innate knowledge 
and propose that infants are born with some conceptual 
representations, namely “core knowledge” that is enriched via 
learning. They suggest that knowledge is domain-specific and 
the human mind consists of specialized knowledge structures 
and functions that are independent from each other (Carey & 
Spelke, 1996). Empiricists, on the other hand, emphasize the 
role of perceptual capabilities and argue that all knowledge is 
acquired via learning. They propose domain-general learning 
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mechanisms and argue that domain-specific knowledge can 
emerge from basic perceptual capabilities (Smith, 2001). 
The Bayesian framework gained great popularity among 
developmental scientists, as it is considered as a middle 
ground in this long-lasting debate (Denison & Xu, 2012). The 
Bayesian modeling approaches emphasize the role of both 
prior knowledge and the current observations to account for 
conceptual growth and learning. More specifically, they allow 
researchers to formulate explicit hypotheses about the problem 
that learners have to solve, the minimal representational 
capacities that are available to the learner and the learning 
mechanisms that can be used to acquire information in 
different environments. This way, the Bayesian framework 
offers a “transparent” approach to the long lasting debates and 
makes the debate “empirically tractable” (Colombo, 2017).
Early markers of the Bayesian 
reasoning
Before applying the Bayesian principles to learning and 
development in children, one could ask whether infants 
and children can actually perform basic computations as 
described in the Bayesian framework. For example, can they 
extract statistical information from observed data? Can they 
21
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represent probabilistic information? And, can they generalize 
from samples to populations or the other way around?
The first line of evidence for early markers of the 
Bayesian reasoning comes from studies that investigated 
statistical learning in infants. In their seminal work, Saffran, 
Aslin, and Newport (1996) demonstrated that infants learn to 
segment artificial language based on transitional probabilities 
between elements. They presented infants with speech streams 
of pseudo-words that consisted of syllables that were ordered 
according to deterministic transitional probabilities (i.e. 1.0). 
When in the test phase, infants were presented with the same 
syllables but in a different order (i.e. non-words), together with 
pseudo-words, they paid attention to the non-words for longer 
than to the pseudo-words indicating that they had recognized 
the pseudo words  as familiar and showed dishabituation 
in case of novel stimuli (i.e. non-words). Today, there is 
ample evidence in the literature showing that from early on 
in life humans capture the statistical regularities in their 
surroundings (Ruffman, Taumoepeau, & Perkins, 2012). This 
framework has been extensively investigated within different 
domains, such as the visual (Kirkham, Slemmer, & Johnson, 
2002) and the action domain (Baldwin, Andersson, Saffran, & 
Meyer, 2008; Monroy, Gerson, & Hunnius, 2017), in different 
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periods during development, from the neonatal period (Bulf, 
Johnson, & Valenza, 2011) to adulthood (Saffran, Johnson, 
Aslin, & Newport, 1999), and among various developmental 
populations (Cashon et al., 2016; Roser et al., 2015).
Another line of evidence for early markers of the 
Bayesian reasoning comes from studies investigating 
probabilistic inference in young children. There is a growing 
literature showing that infants as young as 6 months of age 
infer the likelihood of events, therefore, they represent a 
basic form of probability information (Denison, Xu, & Reed, 
2013; Denison & Xu, 2014; Lawson & Rakison, 2013; Téglás, 
Girotto, Gonzalez, & Bonatti, 2007; Téglás, Ibanez-Lillo, 
Costa, & Bonatti, 2015; Xu & Garcia, 2008). In a series of 
experiments, Xu and Garcia (2008) presented 8-month-old 
infants with a box containing many red balls and only a few 
white balls from which they drew matching and mismatching 
samples in alternating trials. The matching samples contained 
mostly red balls and a few white balls, whereas mismatching 
samples had mostly white and a few red balls. Data revealed 
that 8-month-old infants inferred the probability of a sample 
given the population and looked longer at the unlikely sample 
suggesting that their expectations about the likelihood of 
events were violated when they were presented with an 
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unlikely outcome. 
A related line of work investigated whether statistical 
detection skills could guide broader inferences. In a study by 
Kushnir, Xu, and Wellman (2010), 20-month-old children 
observed an agent picking five toys of the same type from a 
population box that held either mostly toys from a different 
type or in which the two types of toys were more evenly 
distributed. Children were then asked to give the agent the 
toy he liked best. Data showed that children more often chose 
the toy that the agent picked before, after having observed the 
agent picking from a population box that held mostly toys 
from a different type, whereas they did so less often when they 
had observed the agent picking the toys from a population box 
with toys of equal ratio. These results suggest that 20-month-
old infants inferred preferences of others based on systematic 
violations of random sampling.
Other researchers examined whether and how children’s 
inferences might be explained by Bayesian principles 
(Bonawitz, Fisher, & Schulz, 2007; Gopnik et al., 2001; Griffiths, 
Sobel, Tenenbaum, & Gopnik, 2011; Gweon, Tenenbaum, & 
Schulz, 2010; Schulz & Bonawitz, 2007; Schulz, Bonawitz, 
& Griffiths, 2007; Schulz, Gopnik, & Glymour, 2007). This 
body of work mainly focused on how children integrate prior 
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information with current evidence to infer causal structures 
generating the data. In the following section, I will focus on 
learning and address how Bayesian framework has been used 
to explain learning in development.
Bayesian learning in development 
Given their limited experience and world knowledge, early 
learners face the difficult task of learning the statistics of 
the environment under uncertainty and having to build 
knowledge. As described earlier, research has shown that 
infants are sensitive to the likelihood of events and use 
probabilistic information to guide their inferences about 
others’ preferences (Kushnir, Xu, & Wellman, 2010; Xu & 
Garcia, 2008). However, how do infants use probabilistic 
information to learn about their environment? How do they 
build up prior knowledge? How do they learn the structure 
that generated the data? Among competing options, how do 
they select the right structure that produced the data? 
The Bayesian accounts of learning in development 
mainly focus on how young children perform statistical 
inference over causal structures (Gopnik & Tenenbaum, 
2007). Researchers using this framework argue that the 
learner’s task is to use the data to learn the structure that 
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generated it. Making an analogy to vision research, they 
suggest that this is an “inverse problem”, as the learner has to 
reason backward from the data to the underlying structure 
(Gopnik, Glymour, Sobel, Schulz, Kushnir, & Danks, 2004). 
The Bayesian framework provides a comprehensive view on 
early learning that combines both structured knowledge and 
statistics, hence, offering an alternative to the long-lasting 
dichotomies, as outlined above (Denison & Xu, 2012). Yet 
some researchers argue that knowledge about the structure 
is already present prior to learning (Carey, 2009; Spelke & 
Kinzler, 2007), others, using hierarchical Bayesian models, 
provide explanations on how these structural constraints can 
be learned (Lucas et al., 2014; Xu & Tenenbaum, 2007).
Within the Bayesian framework, learning is described 
as a generative process because the learner evaluates possible 
hypotheses that might have produced the data and makes 
predictions based on the most likely hypothesis (Perfors, 
Tenenbaum, Griffiths, & Xu, 2011). Bayes’ rule explains how 
the probability of a particular structure is determined given 
new evidence, and thus, provides an explanation of how 
learning occurs. As evidence accumulates, priors are updated 
to a new posterior, which becomes the new prior for the 
next observation. This sequential pattern allows learning the 
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parameters of the environment while still acquiring new data 
(O’Reilly, Jbabdi, & Behrens, 2012). 
The Bayesian framework is also used to account for 
cognitive changes in development, given that the cognitive 
development can be defined as the changes resulting from 
learning. From this point of view, it has been argued that as 
development progresses, learners face situations in which 
current models that represent the structure of the outside 
world become inadequate. This calls for a revision of the 
child’s current world model, or “theories” as some researchers 
call it (Gopnik et al., 2004), which favor a new world model 
that represents the current state of the environment more 
accurately. Think of a toddler who believes that everybody 
eats peanut butter just like her, and thus, has a world model 
suggesting that everybody has the same food choices. On 
the other hand, a more complex model would suggest that 
different people might have different choices, say some might 
favor jam over peanut butter. Yet being more complex, the 
second model explains the real world better, as it is very 
unlikely that people have unified choices. Probabilistic 
models, such as the Bayesian ones, in principle, could provide 
explanations on how this model revision process occurs and 
particularly how the child learner evaluates the explanatory 
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power of alternative models using the Bayes rule. Based on the 
accumulated evidence, one model becomes more likely than 
another, which then enables the learner to use this model to 
make predictions. In other words, accumulated experiences 
of certain events allow the learner to give more weight to 
the models with better explanatory power over the other. 
Cognitive development is the result of this process where the 
learners recognize the inadequacy of their current models 
and modify them in favor of a new one (Perfors et al., 2011). 
In addition to providing clear explanations of the 
cognitive mechanisms that bring about certain behavior, 
the Bayesian framework has also been used to explain how 
the brain functions. In the next section, I will focus on an 
example of the Bayesian accounts of brain function, namely 
Predictive Processing, and summarize the main assumptions 
of this account. Moreover, I will briefly sketch recent studies 
with adult participants providing evidence on the key notions 
of the Predictive Processing framework. Last, I will focus on 
cognitive development and summarize the emerging evidence 
on the predictive architecture of the infant brain.
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The Bayesian approaches to 
brain functioning 
Over the last ten years, the Bayesian brain hypothesis has 
gained great popularity among neuroscientists to explain how 
human brain functions (Friston, 2010; Knill & Pouget, 2004). 
It has been argued that the brain constantly infers the causes 
of its sensations based on a generative model of the world. To 
infer the causes of the sensory input, the brain needs a causal 
map of the connections among the states of the environment 
that cause these sensations. Accordingly, the functional 
connectivity patterns in the brain encode the causal relation 
patterns that generated the sensory information (Friston, 
2012).
Predictive Processing
Predictive coding is an example of the Bayesian brain accounts 
that proposes a process-level description of brain functioning 
based on the Bayesian principles. In this section, I will refer 
to the conceptual descriptions of this account, namely the 
Predictive Processing framework.
The Predictive Processing framework is proposed to be 
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a unifying account that explains how the brain works (Friston, 
2010). One of the main assumptions of this framework is 
that the brain functions approximately in a Bayes optimal 
manner. That is, the brain uses probabilistic models to 
generate predictions that are compared to the sensory input 
to update the posterior beliefs according to the Bayes’ rule. 
Therefore, one key assumption of this framework is that the 
brain is a “prediction machine”, which constantly predicts 
current and future sensory input (Clark, 2013). Another 
essential characteristic of the framework is that the brain is 
a hierarchical system that consists of lower-level and higher-
level areas that continuously communicate with one another. 
Finally, the brain works according to the free energy principle, 
which assumes that the fundamental aim of the brain is to 
minimize its prediction errors (Friston, 2010; Hohwy, 2007; 
Kwisthout, Bekkering, & van Rooij, 2017). 
The Predictive Processing account suggests that our 
brains continuously make predictions about the causes of 
the sensory input. These predictions, which are generated by 
internal models, are compared to the actual sensory input at 
every level of the hierarchy. The mismatches between what is 
predicted and what is observed, namely the prediction errors, 
are sent back to the upper levels of the hierarchy in order to 
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update the predictions, and hence, the internal models. As 
the prediction errors are reduced, predictions are optimized 
to eventually maximize the accuracy of the internal models 
(Friston, 2005; 2010). Among other methods, one can reduce 
the prediction errors either by revising one’s beliefs, which 
is changing the probability distribution over the possible 
hypotheses while keeping the model constant, or by revising 
one’s entire model such as adding new variables to the causal 
network. Whereas belief revision might occur in situations 
where the observation is unexpected but possible given 
one’s model, model revision takes place when one’s current 
world model is inadequate to explain environmental changes 
(Kwisthout, Bekkering, & van Rooij, 2017; O’Reilly, 2013). 
Although initially the Predictive Processing account has 
been formulated to explain basic low-level processes such as 
visual perception (Rao & Ballard, 1998), over the last decade, it 
has been extended to also describe higher-level processes such 
as action understanding (Kilner, Friston, & Frith, 2007) and 
theory-of mind (Koster-Hale & Saxe, 2013). Whereas most of 
the work has focused on theoretical descriptions of cognitive 
processes using the Predictive Processing framework, there 
is now also a growing body of literature that aims to find 
empirical evidence for the key notions of the framework (den 
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Ouden, Daunizeau, Roiser, Friston, & Stephan, 2010;  Egner, 
Monti, & Summerfield, 2010; Kok, Jehee, & de Lange, 2012; 
Kok, Bains, Mourik, Norris, & de Lange, 2016; Wacongne et 
al., 2011). For example, in a study by van Pelt and colleagues 
(2016), the Predictive Processing framework was used to 
describe higher-order cognitive processes such as action 
perception. In a simulated bowling game, participants were 
required to form predictive models where they integrated 
top-down predictions about the action outcomes (i.e. the 
score) with bottom-up sensory information about the action 
kinematics (i.e. throwing direction). Using the Granger-
causal connectivity method, van Pelt and colleagues (2016) 
showed that oscillatory beta-band activity reflects backward 
top-down prediction signals, whereas gamma-band activity 
represents feed-forward bottom-up prediction errors. These 
findings provide initial evidence suggesting how human 
brain function could be explained according to the Predictive 
Processing framework.
Predictive Processing in development
Although there is ample evidence in the adult literature 
indicating that an adult brain might be working based on 
the principles of Predictive Processing (Egner, Monti, & 
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Summerfield, 2010; van Pelt et al., 2016; Wacongne et al., 
2011), our knowledge on the predictive nature of the infant 
brain is in its infancy. Although the Predictive Processing 
framework is suggested to be a unifying account of brain 
functioning (Friston, 2010), it is still an open question whether 
the main machinery to form generative models is already 
functional early in life. Recently, in a functional near infrared 
spectroscopy (fNIRS) study using an omission paradigm, 
Emberson, Richards, and Aslin (2015) have provided the 
first evidence that the predictive architecture of the brain is 
already present as early as 6 months of age. They demonstrated 
that when after a learning period images were unexpectedly 
omitted, infants showed activation in the occipital cortex, 
as if an image was presented, clearly suggesting that infants 
formed a prediction about the expected visual input. 
Importantly, this activation was not observed, if omission was 
expected to happen. Using electroencephalography (EEG) 
with a cross-modal cueing paradigm, Kouider and colleagues 
(2015) have provided further evidence that infants formed 
predictions based on learned associations between auditory 
cues and visual categories, and their neural responses were 
differentially regulated based on the prior knowledge they 
acquired. Whereas early components were amplified for 
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valid cues, late components, such as the positive slow wave 
(PSW), were enhanced for invalid targets. Together, these 
studies provide initial evidence suggesting that an infant 
brain is already capable of forming predictions based on prior 
knowledge and sensory activity is modulated by the violations 
of these predictions.
State of the art and the 
contribution of the current 
work
The field of developmental psychology has extended our 
knowledge greatly to answer the “what” questions of 
development. For example, we now have considerable 
knowledge about at what age infants perform predictive 
tracking with their eyes (Hofsten & Rosander, 1996), 
when they attend to spatial cues (Colombo, 2001) or 
extract statistical regularities (Ruffman, Taumoepeau, & 
Perkins, 2012). Nevertheless, what remains explored less 
is the question of how infants and young children come to 
accomplish these skills and acquire knowledge. For example, 
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how does the learning process work to enable children to 
build up internal models based on experience? Although 
Piaget has asked similar questions already in the previous 
century (i.e. how do children form “schemas” to make sense 
of their environment?), recent advances in theoretical and 
brain sciences provide us with cutting-edge research tools 
that greatly extends our knowledge, potentially beyond 
what Piaget has ever imagined (Piaget & Cook, 1952). To 
move the field forward, the necessary step is to embrace 
an interdisciplinary developmental approach that brings 
recent theoretical formulations, such as Bayesian Predictive 
Processing, neuroimaging methods and computational 
modeling together to provide in-depth explanations of the 
mechanisms underlying early learning processes. Do infants 
generate a model of their environment that allows them to 
make predictions? When their world models do not represent 
the outside world accurately, how do they adjust these 
models? Do they (and if yes how) use prediction errors to 
modulate their internal models? In the next section, I will give 
an outline of this thesis and summarize how I addressed these 
questions by providing an in-depth approach that combines 
behavioral, neural and computational methods.
35
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Outline of the thesis
Dealing with uncertainty is fundamental to everyday life. 
When perceiving the world around us, communicating with 
others or making decisions, our brains make inferences from 
noisy or sparse information. In this thesis, I investigated how 
young children learn simple structures and how the complexity 
of their models increases as development progresses. In 
four experiments, I created learning environments, where 
infants, children and adults built models of the experimental 
structure. In all experiments, unexpected events occurred 
that signaled changes in the environment. The underlying 
assumption in all experiments was that learners that generated 
a model about the experimental structure would respond to 
the unexpected information, by either updating their internal 
models (studies in Chapter 2 and 3) or revising their models 
(studies in Chapter 4 and 5). 
In chapter 2, using a saccadic planning paradigm, I 
examined whether and how infants and adults update their 
predictive internal models in a changing environment. 
In chapter 3, I applied an audio-visual EEG paradigm to 
investigate the neural markers of model updating in infants. 
Chapter 1
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In chapter 4, using an anticipatory looking paradigm, I 
examined how infants, children and adults adapt their models 
of an agent’s actions and the developmental differences in 
the revision of these models. In chapter 5, I examined how 
young children revise their predictive models of others’ 
sampling actions. I compared a computational model based 
on the causal Bayesian network formalization of Predictive 
Processing to young children’s pupillary responses as markers 
of prediction errors. In summary, across different ages, I 
examined learning in development by investigating whether 
and how learners update a model of their environment and 
they revise their world models, if they are inadequate to 
represent outside world accurately.
37
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Infants Use Surprising 
Information to Generate 
Predictive Internal 
Models Better Than 
Adults Do
Chapter 2
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Abstract
Unexpected events provide us with opportunities for learning 
about what to expect from the world around us. Using a 
saccadic-planning paradigm, we investigated whether and 
how infants and adults use surprising information to build 
predictive internal models in a changing environment. 
Participants observed differently colored bees that appeared 
at an unexpected location every few trials. The color cues 
indicated whether the subsequent bees would appear at this 
new location (i.e. update model) or at the same location as 
previously (i.e. no-update model). Infants learned from 
evidence and dissociated different forms of surprising 
information to generate separate models. Unlike infants, 
adults built one single model (i.e. update) and ignored the 
evidence against a unified model. We argue that infants are 
more open to accommodate new information and adjust their 
beliefs flexibly. This is an advantageous learning strategy to 
form accurate representations in dynamic environments, 
which is fundamental to successful adaptation.
Keywords: surprise, prediction, model generation, 
development, learning.
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Introduction
Learning is the process that allows organisms to construct 
and modulate an internal model of the outside world for 
efficient functioning (Friston, 2010; Picard & Friston, 2014). 
Surprising events challenge one’s current model of the world, 
as they often demand adjustments in predictions generated by 
these models (O’Reilly et al., 2013). Here, we used a saccadic 
planning task to investigate whether and how infants and 
adults use surprising information to construct and adjust 
their internal models that represent the statistics of a dynamic 
environment.  
Maintaining an accurate representation of the world is a 
challenge for learners especially in environments that change 
over time. Surprising or unexpected events signaling change 
render old information irrelevant to the present state of the 
world, often making one’s previous models of the environment 
obsolete (Courville, Daw, & Touretzky, 2006). This would then 
promote more learning, as internal models would be adjusted 
to represent the outside world accurately (Courville, Daw, 
& Touretzky, 2006; Payzan-LeNastour, & Bossaerts, 2011). 
Using a saccadic planning paradigm, O’Reilly and colleagues 
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(2013) showed that adults use surprising information to adjust 
their internal models. With a normative Bayesian learner 
model, they formalized differential processes to explain the 
mechanisms behind model generation in adults based on 
unexpected information.
Similarly, for efficient functioning, developing systems 
should not only detect changes but also use surprising 
information to generate and adapt internal models of the 
world. There is ample evidence in the developmental literature 
showing that even human fetuses and newborn infants 
detect changes and respond to deviations from regularities 
(Draganova et al., 2005; Sambeth et al., 2009; Partanen et al., 
2013). However, whether and how developing systems go 
beyond change detection and use surprising information to 
learn needs further investigation. 
Stahl and Feigenson (2015) explored surprise-driven 
learning in human infants. Using a behavioral paradigm, they 
showed that 11-month-old infants explored objects more 
often and learned new functions of the objects more rapidly, 
when these objects were presented earlier in situations that 
disconfirmed their expectations about core knowledge in 
physics (i.e. knowledge about physical rules that is already 
present prior to learning). Although this study demonstrates 
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that unexpected events enhance further learning, it is not 
clear how infants form expectations based on surprising 
information. Because core knowledge is assumed to be already 
present very early on in life, the important question of whether 
and how infants use surprising information to generate 
internal models to make predictions remains unanswered. Do 
they, for example, use each surprising information to build 
an internal model? Alternatively, do they dissociate between 
surprising information in the extent to which they are relevant 
to modulating predictions?
We used a saccadic planning paradigm, similar to 
O’Reilly and colleagues (2013), to address three fundamental 
points. First, we investigated whether and how infants and 
adults use surprising information to construct an internal 
model of a changing environment that would then allow them 
to make predictions. Second, we examined whether infants 
and adults dissociate between surprising information in the 
extent to which they are relevant to updating predictions, 
as it would be inefficient to adjust predictions with respect 
to irrelevant changes. Third, we asked whether infants and 
adults use different strategies to generate internal models and 
modulate their predictions based on surprising information. 
For example, are infants “high temperature” searchers who are 
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more open to exploring alternative models, as recent research 
shows, whereas adults perform “low temperature” searches 
and rapidly form one solid model of the environment (Gopnik, 
Griffiths, & Lucas, 2015)? Using the same procedure (i.e. 
same paradigm, no instructions), we ensured that infants and 
adults had similar prior information about the task specifics. 
We also tested another group of adults with instructions.
Method
Participants
Thirty-nine 14-month-olds (M = 431.23 days, SD = 5.12 days, 
range: 418-438 days, 18 girls) were recruited for the study 
based on power analysis. Three infants did not complete the 
eye-tracking calibration procedure and seven infants were 
excluded during data processing because of failing to reach 
the inclusion criteria (see data processing section). The final 
sample thus included twenty-nine infants (M = 431.90 days, 
SD = 4.71 days, range: 422-438 days, 12 girls). Participants 
were recruited from a database of volunteer families. Families 
received a baby book or 10 Euros for their participation. All 
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data from adult participants were included in the analyses. 
Adult participants were recruited from a database of university 
students (M = 23.41 years, SD = 3.34 years, range 19-33 years, 
36 female, 13 male). Adult participants received gift cards 
of five Euros for their participation. The local social science 
faculty’s ethical committee approved the study (approval 
number: ECG2012-0910-058 DCC-NWO-EUea-Bekkering 
and ECG2012-1301-006 Stapel/Hunnius). 
Materials and procedure
The same stimuli were used for testing infants and adults. We 
used a saccadic planning task in which we manipulated color 
and location of target stimuli. Prior to the start of trials, we 
showed participants an illustration of three differently colored 
bees on a garden background for 3000 milliseconds, as if the 
bees were flying outdoors. Each trial started with an image 
of target position holders on a circle. After 500 milliseconds, 
a fixation image (i.e. a sun image) appeared in the middle of 
the screen, which remained visible for 1000 milliseconds (see 
Figure 1). Following this, participants observed differently 
colored bees that appeared on one of eight designated spots 
on the circle and stayed visible for 1500 milliseconds. One 
trial lasted for a total duration of 3000 milliseconds, and 
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the experiment consisted of 126 trials in total. The trials 
followed each other continuously as a movie sequence rather 
than being presented as separate images. The entire stimulus 
presentation took 6 minutes and 18 seconds. 
The experiment consisted of 98 “expected” trials and 
28 “surprise” trials. There were two types of surprise trials 
that occurred with equal frequencies: surprise/update and 
surprise/no-update trials. We used color cues to indicate 
different trials. Bees could appear in three different colors 
(see Figure 1). We alternated between two colors to display 
surprise/update and expected trials. The surprise/update trial 
bee always had a different color from the ongoing expected 
trial series and indicated the start of a new series of expected 
trials of that color. The color of the surprise/no-update trial 
bee remained the same throughout the experiment.
We manipulated the location of the bees in order to 
dissociate surprise that demanded an update and surprise 
that did not demand an update in predictions. In all surprise 
trials, the location (and color) of the bee differed from the 
previous trials. Participants were thus required to perform 
an eye movement to a new bee location, whereas in expected 
trials, the bee location (and color) remained unchanged. The 
two sorts of surprise trials differed in the trials that followed 
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them. The surprise/update trials were the first of a series of 
trials of the same kind whereas the surprise/no-update trials 
were a one-off event with the subsequent trials’ bee locations 
(and color) returning to what they had been before. Therefore, 
after a surprise/update trial, the subsequent bees continued 
to appear at the same location for on average four trials 
and participants thus had to update their predictions about 
the location of the bees. In the surprise/no-update trials, 
the location of the bee was again surprising, as compared 
to the location of the previous one; however, as this was a 
one-time event, participants were expected to not change 
their predictions about the location of the following bees. 
In expected trials, the bee appeared where it appeared in the 
previous trial. Figure 1 illustrates the paradigm. 
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Trials
 
 
Figure 1: Screen snapshots for the different stimulus types within a continuous 
sequence of trials.
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Together with the fixation image, a brief sound was 
played, and with each bee image, a jump sound was played 
that slightly varied in pitch in order to keep infants’ attention 
on the stimuli. The colors of the bees and associated sounds 
were counterbalanced across participants. The trial order, 
target positions and the distance of the surprising targets 
from the previous targets were pseudo-randomized.
The stimulus materials were created using Psychopy 
(version 1.83.04) which were converted into movies in 1920 
x 1080 screen resolution using the open source software 
Kazaam (version 1.4.5). The stimuli were presented using 
Tobii Studio Software (3.3.0). Gaze data were recorded at 120 
Hz by a corneal reflection eye tracker (Tobii TX300, Tobii 
Technology, Danderyd, Sweden) calibrated using a 9-point 
procedure. The procedure was repeated only if seven or fewer 
calibration points were detected. Adults were seated on a chair 
in front of the eye-tracker screen and infants were seated in a 
baby seat placed on their parents’ lap. All participants viewed 
the testing material from a distance of 60 to 65 cm. 
For infants, the experiment was finished when the 
trials ended or the infant became fussy and stopped looking 
at the screen. All participants were monitored during the 
experiment via a built-in camera, but only infant testing 
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sessions were video-recorded. All adult participants watched 
the entire stimulus presentation. In the second experiment, 
adults did not receive any instructions about the task. This 
way, we wanted to ensure that both infants and adults had the 
same amount of prior knowledge about the task specifics in 
order to robustly measure age related differences in learning 
strategies within the experiment. After the experiment, adult 
participants were asked whether they detected any structure 
in the paradigm and their reports were written down. 
Participants were debriefed afterwards. 
Experiment with adults using 
instructions
We invited another group of adults for a third experiment 
in which we gave them an information sheet about the task 
before they participated in the experiment. Participants were 
informed that targets (i.e. differently colored bees) would 
appear on one of eight designated spots on the circle and a 
specific sound would accompany each target. They were 
informed that mostly the targets appeared at the same location 
for several trials in a row (i.e. expected trials). However, in 
some trials, the targets appeared on a different location on the 
circle (i.e. surprise/update trials). When this happened, the 
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color of the targets would also change, so they knew that they 
should now expect targets to appear at a different location 
from what they had previously been expecting. They were 
further informed that, on some of the trials, the targets would 
appear at random positions on the circle only once. However, 
it is important to note that participants were not informed 
about the specific location where they should expect the 
targets to appear following surprise/no-update trials.
Data processing 
We applied exactly the same protocol to process infant 
and adult data for all experiments. We used the Tobii IV-T 
Fixation Filter to define fixations. Custom-made Python 
scripts (version 3.2) were used to process the fixation data. 
We defined eight areas of interest (AOI) with 140-pixel radius 
around each of the eight designated spots on the circle (Figure 
2). We used fixation latency as the dependent measure, which 
was defined as the latency between the appearance of the bee 
and the first fixation in this AOI. 
We first segmented fixation events for each trial window 
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(i.e. 3000 milliseconds per trial). Minimum fixation duration 
was set to 100 milliseconds and fixations below this value 
were disregarded. To ensure that gaze shifts to the target were 
made from the central fixation image, we only included trials 
in which a valid fixation was detected on the fixation image 
first and then on the target AOI during the same trial window. 
In order to account for the variability in the infant data, it 
was necessary to define an individualized familiarization 
period for each participant.  For this, we targeted the first 
valid surprise/update and surprise/no-update trials for each 
participant, which included at least one expected trial in 
between. This window was regarded as the “familiarization 
phase” and values after this point were taken into account 
for the main analyses. Participants who provided data for at 
least one more surprise/update and surprise/no-update trial 
(separated by expected trials) besides the familiarization 
phase were included in the final sample (infants: expected 
trials, M = 37.62, SD = 17.49; surprise/update trials M = 5.38, 
SD = 2.68, surprise/no-update trials, M = 4.45, SD = 2.38). To 
remove outliers we disregarded fixation latencies which were 
more than double the average value and larger than 3 SDs 
from the mean (cf. O’Reilly et al., 2013). 
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Figure 2: An example stimulus image that shows the position and size of an 
area of interest (AOI). 
Results
We had clear predictions about the adults’ performance in the 
task based on the previous research (cf. O’Reilly et al., 2013) 
and examined whether infants would already show similar 
pattern of responses. As shown in Figure 3, we predicted that 
participants would be slower performing an eye movement to 
surprising targets because in these trials the targets appeared 
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at a location that was different from the previous trials, which 
required re-programming of the eye movement response 
resulting in increased fixation latencies. If participants 
generated separate models to predict the location of the 
upcoming targets for the two different types of surprising trials 
(i.e. surprise/update and surprise/no-update) based on the 
color cues, we expected them to look at the target locations in 
the trials following surprising trials (i.e. trials +1, +2, +3 and so 
forth) significantly faster than in response to surprising trials. 
The pattern of a steep decrease after a surprising trial for both 
surprise/update and surprise/no-update trials indicates that 
two separate models have been built, as it shows that for trials 
+1, a correct prediction about the trial location is generated, 
which differs for surprise/update and surprise/no-update 
trials. In other words, if participants failed to update their 
predictions on surprise/update trials, or conversely, if they 
did update their predictions on surprise/no-update trials, 
they would expect the wrong location on trials +1, and thus, 
have slower fixation latencies on that trial in the condition in 
which the error had occurred.
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Figure 3: An illustration of the predicted fixation latencies on surprise/update, 
surprise/no-update and surrounding trials (i.e. expected trials) if participants 
generate differential models for the two types of surprising trials. Trials 0 
indicate surprising trials (surprise/update or surprise/no-update). Trials -1 are 
the trials immediately before, which were expected, whereas trials +1, +2 and 
+3 are the trials immediately following surprising trials. Please note that if trial 
0 is a surprise/update trial, the target stimulus of trial +1 appears at the same 
location as in trial 0, whereas if trial 0 is a surprise/no-update trial, the target 
of trial +1 appears at the same location as in trial -1.
Experiment-1: Infant experiment
To test our hypotheses we first ran a 2 x 4 repeated measures 
ANOVA with trial type (surprise/update, surprise/no-
update) and trial number (0: surprising trials, trials + 1, 2, 3: 
immediately following trials) as within-subjects factors. This 
analysis revealed a significant main effect of trial number (F 
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(3, 63) = 5.41, p=0.002, η2 = 0.21) and a marginally significant 
main effect of trial type (F  (1, 21) = 3.47, p=0.077, η2 = 0.14). 
Data revealed no trial type by trial number interaction (F 
(3, 63) = 0.20, p=0.896, η2 = 0.01) suggesting that infants’ 
fixation latencies did not differ significantly for the two types 
of surprising trials over the course of trials, which confirmed 
our hypothesis (compare Figure 3 and 4). 
We ran follow up tests using the Least Significant 
Differences method to examine the main effect of trial number. 
These analyses revealed that infants were significantly faster 
to look at the target locations following surprising trials (trials 
0 vs. trials +1: md= 46.08, SE= 19.56, p=0.028; trials 0 vs. trials 
+2: md= 58.42, SE= 17.96, p=0.004; trials 0 vs. trials +3: md= 
80.59, SE= 18.35, p=0.000). These results indicated that infants 
learned from different forms of surprising information and 
generated two separate models accordingly (i.e. update vs. 
no-update).
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Figure 4: Fixation latencies on surprise/update, surprise/no-update and 
surrounding trials (i.e. expected trials) for 14-month-old infants. Trials 0 
indicate surprise/update and surprise/no-update trials themselves. Trials -1 
are the trials immediately before surprise/update or surprise/no-update trials, 
whereas trials +1, +2 and +3 are the trials immediately following surprising trials. 
Error bars indicate the standard error of the mean.
 
Experiment-2: Adult experiment 
without instructions
We had predicted that both, infants and adults would show a 
pattern of responses as illustrated in Figure 3, if they generate 
separate models during the experiment. The data of the adult 
participants, however, revealed a different response pattern 
(compare Figure 3 and 5). Verbal reports indicated that 13 
out of 23 adult participants did not detect any structure in 
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the paradigm and the other 10 participants described diverse 
complex patterns that were not correct. 
To test the response patterns statistically, we used 
the same analyses as for the infant experiment. Because 
Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity indicated that the assumption of 
sphericity had been violated (p < .05), we used Greenhouse-
Geisser corrections. A repeated measures ANOVA with trial 
type (surprise/update, surprise/no-update) and trial number 
(0: surprising trials, trials + 1, 2, 3: immediately following 
trials) revealed a significant main effect of trial type (F (1, 22) 
= 37.08, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.63) and a significant main effect of 
trial number (F (1.45, 31.93) = 15.19, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.41). 
Data also revealed a significant trial type by trial number 
interaction (F (2.20, 48.29) = 12.46, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.36). This 
suggests that adults’ fixation latencies differed for the two trial 
types over the course of trials. 
Follow up tests using the Least Significant Differences 
method for pairwise comparisons of estimated marginal 
means revealed that adults’ responses in surprising trials 
significantly differed from the immediately following trials 
(0 vs. trials +1: md = 32.05, SE = 9.12, p = 0.002; trials 0 vs. 
trials +2: md = 60.44, SE = 15.46, p = 0.001; trials 0 vs. trials 
+3: md = 70.77, SE = 15.59, p < 0.001). Moreover, they were 
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significantly slower in surprise/no-update trials as compared 
to the surprise/update trials (md = 38.04, SE = 6.25, p < 0.001).
Because data revealed a significant trial type by 
trial number interaction, we investigated adults’ response 
patterns in different trials separately for each trial type. We 
ran repeated measures ANOVAs for each trial type with the 
trial number (0: surprising trials, trials + 1, 2, 3: immediately 
following trials) as the within subjects factor, which were 
followed up by tests using the Least Significant Differences 
method for pairwise comparisons of estimated marginal 
means. These analyses revealed a significant main effect 
of trial number both in surprise/update (F (1.99, 43.85) = 
12.69, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.37) and surprise/no-update trials (F 
(1.62, 35.62) = 16.53, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.43). Similar to infants, 
adults were significantly faster to fixate the targets in the trials 
immediately following surprise/update trials suggesting that 
they generated an accurate predictive model for this trial type 
(trials 0 vs. +1: md = 78.33, SE = 17.98, p < 0.001; trials 0 vs. 
+2: md = 78.71, SE = 19.87, p = 0.001; trials 0 vs. +3: md = 
76.05, SE = 18.31, p < 0.001). 
Whereas adults showed the predicted response pattern 
for trials following the surprise/update trials, this was not 
the case for surprise/no-update trials (compare Figure 3 and 
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5). Interestingly, unlike infants, adult participants seemed 
to struggle to generate a surprise/no-update model and 
showed marginally slower fixation latencies in the trials 
immediately following surprise/no-update trials as compared 
to the preceding surprise/no-update trials (trials 0 vs. +1: md 
= -14.23, SE = 7.13, p = 0.059). Nevertheless, they became 
significantly faster to look at the target locations in the 
following trials (trials 0 vs. +2: md = 42.17, SE = 13.26, p = 
0.004; trials 0 vs. +3: md = 65.49, SE = 14.62, p < 0.001). 
Figure 5: Fixation latencies on surprise/update, surprise/no-update and 
surrounding trials (i.e., expected trials) for uninstructed adults. Trials 0 indicate 
surprise/update and surprise/no-update trials themselves. Trials -1 are the 
trials immediately before surprise/update or surprise/no-update trials, 
whereas trials +1, +2 and +3 are the trials immediately following surprising trials. 
Error bars indicate the standard error of the mean.
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Additional analyses for Trials +1
Our analyses revealed that there was no indication that adults 
generated separate models for the two surprising trial types. 
Given these unexpected results, we explored the data further 
to investigate what model the adults did build during the 
experiment. We reasoned that if participants had a tendency 
to update their predictions erroneously in surprise/no-update 
trials, they would first look at the location of the surprise/
no-update bee in the immediately following trials, although 
the bees did not appear at this location in these trials, which 
would result in increased fixation latencies. For comparison, 
we focused on the gaze behavior of both infants and adults 
during the trials immediately following surprise/no-update 
trials and systematically investigated the gaze patterns during 
this time window1. We first determined the number of infant 
and adult participants who shifted their gaze at least once to the 
location of the surprise/no-update trials (i.e. at the location of 
trials 0) also on the immediately following trials (i.e. trials +1). 
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Data revealed that among 29 infants, nine infants expected 
the following target to appear at the location where the 
surprise/no-update target appeared at least once (range 1 to 3 
times). Put differently, on average, only in 5.99 % of all trials 
+1 following surprise/no-update trials, infants expected the 
target to appear at the same location as the previous surprise/
no-update target location (i.e. at the location of trials 0). These 
analyses provide further evidence that infants generated two 
separate models (i.e. update and no-update) and learned to 
adjust their predictions accordingly. 
The adults, however, showed a different pattern. Among 
23 adults, 20 of them expected the target to appear at the same 
location as the previous surprise/no-update trial, in the trial 
after, at least once (range 1 to 11 times out of 14). In adults, 
the average percentage of trials +1 in which they performed 
a gaze-shift to the location of the previous surprise/no-
update location was 29.17 %. These results show that, without 
instructions, adults had a tendency to update their predictions 
following surprise/no-update trials approximately 5 times 
more than the infants did. Together, these results indicate that 
it was more challenging for adults to form separate models for 
the two types of surprising trials. Instead, they likely formed 
a single model and expected the targets of the trials following 
Chapter 2
63
all surprising trials to appear at the same location as the 
surprising trials themselves.
Experiment-3: Adult experiment with 
instructions
Because adults showed different patterns than predicted by 
our hypothesis, we tested another group of adults who were 
provided with instructions about the task. We expected adults 
to perform the task as predicted (i.e. they generate separate 
models) when the uncertainty about the task demands were 
reduced (cf. O’Reilly et al., 2013). For statistical testing, we 
applied the same analysis protocol as reported earlier. Mauchly’s 
Test of Sphericity indicated that the assumption of sphericity 
had been violated (p < .05); therefore, we used Greenhouse-
Geisser corrections. A repeated measures ANOVA with trial 
type (surprise/update, surprise/no-update) and trial number 
(0: surprising trials, trials + 1, 2, 3: immediately following 
trials) indicated a significant main effect of trial number (F 
(1.75, 43.64) = 45.64, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.65) and a significant 
main effect of trial type (F (1, 25) = 24.13, p < 0.001, η2 = 
0.49). Follow-up tests showed that adults were significantly 
faster in the trials immediately following surprising trials 
(trials 0 vs. trials +1: md = 124.24, SE = 17.69, p < 0.001; trials 
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0 vs. trials +2: md = 158.35, SE = 20.25, p < 0.001; trials 0 vs. 
trials +3: md = 145.78, SE = 19.06, p < 0.001). Furthermore, 
they were significantly slower in surprise/no-update trials as 
compared to the surprise/update trials (md = 28.75, SE = 5.85, 
p < 0.001).
Data also revealed a significant trial type by trial 
number interaction in this group (F (1.92, 48.06) = 9.99, p < 
0.001, η2 = 0.29). As illustrated in Figure 6, this interaction 
effect was driven by the slower fixation latencies following 
surprise/no-update trials. This might be because participants 
were specifically informed about where the targets appear 
following surprise/update trials (i.e. expected trials), which 
was not the case for the surprise/no-update trials. Participants 
were only informed that following surprise/no-update trials, 
the targets would not appear where they appeared in the 
preceding surprise/no-update trial. However, overall, the 
response pattern resembled the pattern observed in infants. 
To have a closer look at the response patterns in different 
trial types, we ran separate repeated measures ANOVAs for 
each trial type with trial number (0: surprising trials, trials 
+ 1, 2, 3: immediately following trials) as the within subjects 
factor, which we followed up with tests using the Least 
Significant Differences method for pairwise comparisons of 
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estimated marginal means. Data revealed a significant main 
effect of trial number both in surprise/update (F (1.94, 48.53) 
= 46.48, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.65) and surprise/no-update trials (F 
(3, 75) = 29.25, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.54). Similar to the findings 
in infants, fixation latencies of adults significantly decreased 
in the trials immediately following surprise/update trials 
indicating that they generated a predictive model in these 
trials (trials 0 vs. trials +1: md = 163.51, SE = 20.61, p < 0.001; 
trials 0 vs. trials +2: md = 170.36, SE = 21.35, p < 0.001; trials 
0 vs. trials +3: md = 143.33, SE = 19.47, p < 0.001). Moreover, 
participants were significantly faster to look at the target 
locations also in the trials immediately following surprise/
no-update trials as compared to the surprise/no-update trials 
(trials 0 vs. trials +1: md = 84.96, SE = 19.94, p < 0.001; trials 
0 vs. trials +2: md = 146.34, SE = 20.94, p < 0.001; trials 0 
vs. trials +3: md = 148.23, SE = 20.03, p < 0.001) suggesting 
that, when task demands were made clear, adults formed  a 
separate  predictive model about surprise/no-update trials.
Infants Use Surprising Information to Generate 
Predictive Internal Models Better Than Adults Do
66
Figure 6: Fixation latencies on surprise/update, surprise/no-update and 
surrounding trials (i.e., expected trials) for instructed adults. Trials 0 indicate 
surprise/update and surprise/no-update trials themselves. Trials -1 are the 
trials immediately before surprise/update or surprise/no-update trials, 
whereas trials +1, +2 and +3 are the trials immediately following surprising trials. 
Error bars indicate the standard error of the mean.
Chapter 2
67
Discussion
In three experiments, we examined whether infants and adults 
used surprising information to generate predictive internal 
models in a changing environment. Infants dissociated 
between surprising information in the extent to which it was 
relevant to modulating their predictions and built two internal 
models accordingly. Interestingly, unlike infants, when not 
guided by instructions, adults seemed to form only one model 
and used this single model to make predictions. When adults 
received instructions about the task, they showed a response 
pattern that resembled the infants’ more closely.
Although infants and adults who were not instructed 
had exactly the same prior knowledge about the task specifics, 
we observed clear differences in their responses. We argue 
that this finding might be explained by infants being more 
open to accommodate new information than adults were. It 
could be that infants are more ready to learn from evidence 
and adjust their beliefs flexibly, due to having less precise 
beliefs about the parameters of the environment (Courville, 
Daw, & Touretzky, 2006). When not guided by instructions, 
adults, on the other hand, might have formed one solid model 
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to reduce the uncertainty and might have ignored some of 
the available evidence. This argument is further supported by 
the additional analyses showing that after surprise/no-update 
trials, uninstructed adults initially expected the target to appear 
at the surprise/no-update location, just like after surprise/
update trials. They then looked at the correct target location, 
resulting in increased fixation latencies in trials immediately 
following surprise/no-update trials. This response pattern 
shows that adults had a tendency to use only one model (i.e. 
update), despite the evidence suggesting a differentiation 
between different forms of surprising information.
Relatedly, one might claim that because of poorer 
memory skills, infants were not able to represent prior 
information and their responses were driven solely by the 
current data (i.e. simply looking at a spot where something 
appears). Therefore, one could argue that a mechanism based 
on forgetting previous information might have helped infants 
to succeed on this task. Although neural and modeling 
work would be useful to explore this argument further, it 
is insufficient to account for infants’ pattern of responses. 
If infants’ looking responses were only driven by current 
observations, we would have observed an even response 
pattern across all trials. First, infants would be equally fast to 
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look at the target locations regardless of whether the target 
appears at an unexpected location or not. That is, they would 
not show increased fixation latencies in surprising trials, if 
they did not use prior information about where the targets 
appear. Second, if infants did not learn that targets appear 
at different locations based on whether the previous trial is 
an update or no-update trial, they would not be fast again to 
look at the correct target locations in the trials immediately 
following these trials (see Figure 4). Therefore, it is unlikely 
that infants did not encode any previous information to 
generate predictive models and their responses were driven 
purely by the current input.
The differences between infants and uninstructed adults 
show fascinating similarity to recent findings suggesting that 
young children use evidence to learn novel causal links better 
than adults do (Gopnik, Griffiths, & Lucas, 2015; Lucas et al., 
2014). For example, in a study by Lucas and colleagues (2014), 
adults and 4-year-old children had to infer how a machine 
played music when some objects were placed on top of it. In 
some cases, a single object activated the machine (i.e. individual 
principle) whereas in other cases it was a combination of 
objects (i.e. combination principle) activating the machine. 
Children learned both principles to make the machine play 
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music and selected the right principle when they had to 
infer which principle should work. However, adults tended 
to stick to the individual principle that they learned earlier 
and placed single objects to activate the machine, although 
current evidence was against this principle. Similarly, in the 
current paradigm, without instructions, adult participants 
seemed to form one model (i.e. a surprising information 
means an update of location) and make predictions based 
on this model to explain all surprising information, although 
evidence suggested a differentiation between them. Because 
adults exploited one strategy (i.e. update), they were less open 
to exploring alternative explanations, which hindered them 
from performing the task successfully.
Another interesting finding of the current study was 
that adults’ responses differed based on whether they received 
instructions prior to the task or not. Whereas uninstructed 
adults showed increased fixation latencies after observing 
surprise/no-update trials, instructed adults performed the 
task more similar to the infants by showing reduced fixation 
latencies in the trials following surprise/no-update trials. One 
explanation for these differences might be that because in 
the absence of instructions, adults had to detect the structure 
(e.g., an update model) and the parameters (e.g., the target 
Chapter 2
71
will now appear where it just appeared) of the current task to 
make predictions accordingly (Braun, Mehring, & Wolpert, 
2010). For uninstructed adults, detecting the structure of 
the environment (and the parameters thereof) might have 
been a challenging task because they had to narrow down 
a large hypotheses space to figure out the general structure 
and the parameters of the environment2. For infants, the 
task might have been easier, as there is ample evidence in 
the developmental literature showing that infants detect 
even complex statistical regularities (Kirkham, Slemmer, 
& Johnson, 2002; Ruffman, Taumoepeau, & Perkins, 2012; 
Saffran, Aslin, & Newport, 1996) and younger learners are 
better than the older ones and adults (Kuhl, 2004; Lucas et al., 
2014). Therefore, it might be that instructions helped adults to 
reduce the hypotheses space, hence, the complexity such that 
they showed a pattern similar to the one shown by infants.
Here, we demonstrated that infants and adults use 
surprising information to generate predictive internal models 
that represent the statistics of a dynamic environment. Infants 
learned from unexpected information and they dissociated 
between different forms of surprising information to generate 
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separate models accordingly. Unlike infants, when not guided 
by instructions, adults seemed to form a single model to 
make predictions and ignore the evidence against a unified 
model. When instructed, adults showed a response pattern 
closer to that of infants. We argue that infants are more 
open to accommodate new information and update their 
beliefs flexibly, which is an advantageous learning strategy 
to represent dynamic environments. This strategy enables 
developing systems to adjust to changes easily, a capacity that 
is key to adapting to novel environments.
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Abstract
 
Internal models generated through learning represent 
the statistical structure of the outside world and facilitate 
information processing. Unexpected events challenge one’s 
current knowledge of the world, often requiring an updating 
of the internal models. We investigated whether 9-month-old 
infants form predictions based on the repeated observations 
of a sequence of images and respond to the violations of their 
predictions when the sequence was unexpectedly interrupted. 
Moreover, we examined whether they dissociate between 
different types of unexpected events in the extent to which 
they are relevant to modulating their predictive models. In 
an audio-visual electroencephalography (EEG) paradigm, 
we presented infants with a continuous sequence of stimuli 
which followed a predictable pattern (i.e. same stimuli were 
repeated for several trials; “expected” trials). Two types of 
cues (i.e. “update” and “no-update”) were interspersed among 
the expected trials, which differed in terms of whether or not 
they signaled a future change in the sequence. Following the 
“update” cue, the predicted pattern was altered, whereas the 
pattern remained the same after the “no-update” cue. When 
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the predicted sequence was unexpectedly interrupted by 
the cues, infants showed an amplified negative central (Nc), 
representing violations of their predictions. The unexpected 
appearance of the cues also modulated later components, 
namely the positive slow wave (PSW). However, no 
differential response to the two types of cues was observed 
at later stages of processing. Additional analyses showed that 
infants associated unexpected cues with future changes in 
the sequence. Interestingly, only when a predicted change 
was absent (i.e. following the “no-update” cues) a prominent 
response was observed in the early components indicating a 
top-down modulation of early sensory processing in infants. 
Our study corroborates emerging evidence suggesting that 
the basic machinery to build predictive models might already 
be functional early on in life. 
Keywords: internal models, predictive processing, 
development, event-related potentials.
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Introduction
Uncertainty is fundamental to everyday life. In order to deal 
with the uncertainty embedded in environmental changes, 
learning systems generate a model of the outside world based 
on the statistical information (O’Reilly 2013; Picard & Friston, 
2010). It has been suggested that our brains constantly predict 
its sensory input using generative models that are organized 
through a hierarchy of increasingly complex hypotheses about 
the states of the world. The parts of the input that cannot 
be predicted by one’s current generative model, namely the 
prediction errors, are propagated back to the upper levels in 
the hierarchy to update the models further (Friston, 2010). 
Infants go through rapid physical and mental 
developmental changes during the first years of life. Because 
their world knowledge and experience are limited as 
compared to adults, it might be reasonable to assume that 
infants are likely to have more uncertainty about the structure 
of the world. In this study, we investigated whether 9-month-
old infants form generative models that would allow them to 
make predictions in a dynamic environment. Moreover, we 
examined whether they dissociate between different types of 
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unexpected events in the extent to which they are relevant to 
modulating their predictive models.
Sudden changes in the environment elicit discrepancies 
between what has been predicted and what is observed (Barto, 
Mirolli, & Baldassarre, 2013). They increase the error signal in 
the brain that is assumed to be used to optimize the internal 
models further (Friston, 2010). In other words, prediction 
errors lead to the updating of the internal models such that 
they represent statistics of the outside world accurately 
(Courville, Daw, & Touretzky, 2006; Payzan- LeNastour & 
Bossaerts, 2011). In an fMRI study, O’Reilly and colleagues 
(2013) investigated how adults adjust their internal models 
in response to unpredicted changes in the environment.  In 
a saccadic planning paradigm, they presented adults with 
targets that changed location in every few trials. In most of 
the trials, the target locations were drawn from Gaussian 
distributions (i.e. update trials), therefore, the targets 
continued to appear around the same area for a couple of 
trials. In contrast, in some of the trials, the targets appeared at 
random locations over the circle for once (i.e. one-off trials). 
Therefore, in both trials, the sudden appearances of the 
targets at new locations were unexpected. Because the targets 
continued to appear at the same location following the update 
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trials, participants were expected to update their models only 
in the update trials. However, in one-off trials, the updating 
of the models would lead to erroneous predictions about the 
target locations because the targets did not continue to appear 
at the one-off location in the following trials. Data revealed 
activation in the parietal cortex when an immediate motor 
response was programmed, when the location of the targets 
were unexpectedly changed in both trial types. However, the 
anterior cingulate cortex was specifically active only when 
participants updated their models of the location of the 
targets. These findings show that as the uncertainty about the 
parameters of the environment increases, adults adjust their 
internal models to represent the statistics of the outside world 
accurately.
 Although there is ample evidence in the adult 
literature on how error signals are used to optimize predictive 
internal models (Egner, Monti, & Summerfield, 2010; van 
Pelt et al., 2016; Wacongne et al., 2011), our knowledge on 
the predictive nature of the infant brain is at its infancy. 
For example, whether infants in their first year of life form 
predictions based on the statistical information and respond 
to the violation of their predictions remains largely unknown. 
In a functional near infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) study 
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using an omission paradigm, Emberson, Richards, and Aslin 
(2015), have provided the first evidence that the predictive 
architecture of the brain is already present as early as 6 
months. Emberson and colleagues (2015) demonstrated 
that after a learning period, when images were unexpectedly 
omitted, infants showed activation in the occipital cortex, 
as if an image was presented, suggesting that they generated 
predictions about the visual input. Importantly, this 
activation was not observed, if omission was expected to 
happen. Using EEG with a cross-modal cueing paradigm, 
Kouider and colleagues (2015) provided further evidence that 
infants formed predictions as a result of learning associations 
between auditory cues and visual categories, and their neural 
responses were differentially regulated based on the prior 
knowledge they acquired. Whereas early components were 
amplified for valid cues, late components, such as positive 
slow wave (PSW), were enhanced for invalid targets. These 
studies together suggest that the infant brain is already 
capable of forming predictions based on prior knowledge 
and sensory activity is modulated by the violations of these 
predictions. Although these studies provide initial evidence 
on the predictive nature of the infant brain, whether infants, 
like adults, show differential brain activity in response to 
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unexpected events in the extent to which they are relevant to 
updating their internal models remains entirely unknown.
Violations of predictions occur when the current 
sensory input does not match the predictions (Friston, 
2010). The brain responds to these violations as early as 100 
milliseconds after the stimulus onset with activation mostly 
observed at the frontal central regions of the brain, which is 
reflected in the N1 or mismatch negativity response (MMN) 
of event-related potentials (ERPs) (Hsu, Hamalainen, & 
Waszak, 2014; Stefanics, Kremláèek, & Czigler, 2014). While 
direct evidence on the early precursors of ERP components 
such as the N1 is scarce (de Haan, 2013; Marinović, Hoehl, 
& Pauen, 2014), recent work suggests that one of the most 
prominent infant ERP components, namely the negative 
central (Nc), might be considered as a neural marker of 
violations of predicted regularities (Jeste et al., 2015). The Nc 
is a mid-latency component that is largely observed in young 
children around the frontal central regions of the brain across 
several studies and in response to different visual stimuli 
(Hoehl, Wiese, & Striano, 2008; Reynolds & Richards, 2005; 
Striano, Reid, & Hoehl, 2006; Webb, Long, & Nelson, 2005). 
In general, the infant Nc is assumed to capture how much 
attention infants allocate when observing stimuli (Reynolds 
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et al., 2014; Richards, 2003). Although the precise functional 
significance of the Nc component is still under debate, there 
is considerable evidence suggesting that the Nc is amplified 
when the stimuli are unexpected (Ackles & Cook, 2009; Jeste 
et al., 2015; Kaduk, Elsner, & Reid; 2013; Snyder et al., 2010). 
Based on the cortical source analysis of infant ERP data, 
Reynolds and Richards (2005) have suggested that areas in 
the prefrontal cortex including the anterior cingulate cortex 
likely are the generators of the infant Nc component. These 
findings altogether suggest that the infant Nc might be evoked 
when statistical regularities are interrupted by changes in 
the environment. Accordingly, in this study, we examined 
whether infants would show an Nc response, when their 
predictions are violated by the unexpected changes in the 
predicted sequence of events.
Beyond detecting change, efficient systems should 
use prediction errors to adjust their internal models of the 
world. Although there is ambiguity on the interpretation of 
how error response modulate early sensory processing (for 
a review of two dominant hypotheses, namely adaptation 
and model adjustment, see Garrido et al., 2009), consensus 
seems to be reached in interpreting neural responses in later 
stages of processing (Wacongne et al., 2011). For example, the 
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P3b wave in adults, observed 300-400 ms after the stimulus 
onset around parietal-central channels, has been assumed 
to represent updating of memory representations (Polich, 
2007). Recent work shows that P3b is elicited in response 
to unexpected stimuli that violate predictions about the 
probabilistic contingencies (Feldman & Friston, 2010). Even 
more interestingly, the P3b response is evoked also in the 
absence of stimuli, when a predicted input is deliberately 
omitted (Wacongne et al., 2011). These findings show that 
the P3b is elicited when one’s predictions are violated by the 
current input, which calls for an updating of the internal 
models (Marzecová et  al., 2017; Kolossa, Kopp, & Fingscheidt, 
2015). In development, there is very little evidence on which 
electrophysiological signals potentially mark the updating of 
internal models at later stages of processing (Kouider et al., 
2015). A promising candidate, namely the positive slow wave 
(PSW), is a late infant ERP component elicited approximately 
700-1000 ms after the stimulus onset. The PSW has 
traditionally been considered to represent memory updating 
especially in response to partially encoded infrequent stimuli 
(de Haan, 2013; Elsner, Jeschonek, & Pauen, 2013). Moreover, 
the infant PSW is assumed to be an early precursor of P3 wave 
in adults (de Haan, 2013; Marinović, Hoehl, & Pauen, 2014). 
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As one of the most well studied infant ERP components, here, 
we investigated whether PSW would be a late neural marker 
of predictive models in infants.
More evidence is needed to understand how infants’ 
brains form generative models that would allow them to 
make predictions, and respond to the violations of these 
predictions. More interestingly, whether infants dissociate 
between different forms of unexpected events in the extent to 
which they are relevant to modulating their internal models 
is entirely unknown. In this study, we investigated the neural 
markers that are thought to be indicative of predictive models 
in young infants. In an audio-visual EEG paradigm, we 
presented 9-month-old infants with a continuous sequence 
of stimuli which followed a predictable pattern (i.e. same 
stimuli were repeated for several trials in a row; “expected” 
trials). Two types of cues (i.e. “update” and “no-update”) 
were interspersed among the expected trials, which differed 
in terms of whether or not they signaled a future change in 
the sequence. The predicted pattern was altered following 
the “update” cue whereas the same sequence continued after 
the “no-update” cue.  We hypothesized that if participants 
form predictions based on the repeated observations of the 
predictable stimuli, they would show an error response when 
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their predictions are violated by the unexpected appearance 
of the cues. Moreover, if they learn the predictive value of the 
cues, once they observe the “update” cue, they would expect 
the following images to be different from the immediately 
preceding sequence, whereas they would not expect any 
change in the sequence following the “no-update” cue (see 
Figure 1). 
We identified the ERP components of interest based 
on the literature. First, we examined the Nc in response to 
the presentation of the unexpected cues. We hypothesized 
that sudden changes in a predicted sequence of events would 
elicit an Nc response in infants. In line with the previous 
studies testing infants of similar age ranges, we defined a time 
window between 350 to 550 milliseconds for the Nc, and 
calculated the mean amplitude during this window around 
the frontal-central channels (Striano, Reid, & Hoehl, 2006). 
We predicted that infants would show larger Nc amplitudes 
in response to “update” and “no-update” cues as compared to 
the expected images (i.e. repetition of the same stimuli), if the 
sudden appearance of the cues is indeed unexpected. As the 
sudden appearance of the cues should be equally unexpected 
for the two trial types, we predicted no difference in the Nc 
amplitude between the two types of unexpected cues at this 
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early stage of processing.
To determine the neural markers of predictive models 
in later stages of processing, we examined the PSW response, 
700 to 1000 milliseconds after the stimulus onset (Grossmann 
& Johnson, 2007; Kopp & Lindenberger, 2011). Based on the 
literature, we investigated the PSW around central-parietal 
regions as ERP research in adults showed that these regions 
are involved in updating of generative internal models 
(Conroy & Polich, 2007). We reasoned that if infants learn 
the information value of the cues, the update-related activity 
should only be triggered in response to the “update” cue. 
Therefore, we predicted that infants would show larger PSW 
when they observe the “update” cue as compared to the “no-
update” cue and expected images. Finally, in order to further 
examine infants’ internal models during the experiment; we 
calculated the Nc and PSW for the images following the cues. 
This way, we aimed to explore infants’ reactions in response to 
an observed change or absence of a change in the environment, 
which is further informative about the content of the models 
they generated during the experiment.
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Method
Participants
We recruited 60 9-month-old infants (M = 272.58 days, SD 
= 8.86 days, range: 251-289 days, 32 girls). In total 37 infants 
were excluded from the analysis. One infant was unwilling 
to wear the EEG cap and the other 36 infants were excluded 
during data processing due to a lack of sufficient artifact-free 
trials for the analyses (see EEG data processing). The final 
sample consisted of 23 infants (M = 272.27 days, SD = 9.31 
days, range: 251-288 days, 11 girls). This high attrition rate 
is expected in infant EEG studies (Stets, Stahl, & Reid, 2012). 
Participants were recruited from a database of volunteer 
families. Families received baby books or monetary reward 
for their participation. The local ethics review board approved 
the study (CMO 2012/012-NL39352.091.12).
Stimuli and design
Infants observed a continuous sequence of images presented 
on a computer screen. The images were circles, triangles (i.e. 
the cues) and differently colored cartoon-bees that alternated 
between four colors. The cues were presented in the center 
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of the screen, whereas the bees appeared on one of eight 
spots on an imaginary circle in the periphery. There were 90 
“expected” trials, 25 “update” and 25 “no-update” trials in the 
experiment. 
As shown in Figure 1, each trial started with a gray 
screen. After 500 milliseconds, a fixation image (i.e., a 
cross) appeared in the center of the screen lasting for 1000 
milliseconds. In expected trials, the fixation image was 
followed by a bee image that had the same color and appeared 
at the same location (with the same sound) as in the previous 
trial (1500 ms). In total, an expected trial lasted for 3000 
milliseconds. In “update” and “no-update” trials, either a 
red triangle or a red circle respectively (1500 ms) appeared 
in between the fixation image and the bee image in order to 
provide participants with a cue that was  informative about the 
trial type. The cues indicated whether the bee will change its 
location, color and sound in the next scene (i.e. update trial) 
or it will appear at the same location and in the same color 
as it was in the trial before (i.e. no-update trial). Together 
with the cues, “update” and “no-update” trials lasted for 4500 
milliseconds in total. The entire stimulus presentation took 
approximately 9 minutes.
To keep infants’ attention on the task longer, we used 
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auditory stimuli that accompanied the images. The fixation 
cross was accompanied by a brief beep sound to draw infants’ 
attention to the beginning of the trials. Each location was 
associated with a brief jumping sound (i.e. eight different 
sounds), which was played when the bee appeared at that 
location. The sounds for locations differed in their pitch. The 
circle and the triangle (i.e., cues) were also accompanied with 
sounds. For the cues, two sounds were created by using one 
unique sound which was then played backwards to create the 
other sound in order to minimize the differences between the 
auditory information. 
The colors of the bees, the cues, and all associated sounds 
were counterbalanced. The positions of the bees and the 
presentation order were randomized across participants. The 
visual stimuli were manipulated using open source software 
GIMP (version 2.8.16) and the auditory stimuli were created 
with Audacity software (version 2.0.5). The experiment was 
implemented in Presentation Software (Neurobehavioral 
Systems, Inc., Albany, CA).
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Trials
Figure 1: An example of the different stimulus types within a continuous 
sequence of presentation. Each image was accompanied by a particular sound. 
It should be noted that the bee images following the cues were considered 
separate and they were not included in the expected trials. In this figure, only 
two colors are used for illustration purposes. In the experiment, the bees 
alternated between four colors.
Procedure
Each session took approximately 60 minutes including a warm-
up phase during which the families were informed about the 
EEG procedure. Infants were fitted with an infant-sized EEG 
cap (actiCap, Brain Products GmbH, Munich, Germany). 
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Infants sat on their parent’s lap in an electrically shielded 
testing room while EEG was recorded. Parents were instructed 
to keep the interaction with their child minimal during the 
measurement. The session was recorded via cameras, which 
also allowed us to continuously monitor the parent and 
the child during the experiment in the control room. If the 
infant started to get fussy, brief breaks were introduced. The 
experiment ended when all trials were completed or when the 
infant disengaged. Families were debriefed about the goals of 
the experiment after the measurement.
EEG recordings
We collected EEG data using 32 Ag/AgCl active electrodes 
arranged in the 10-20 layout, which were placed on an infant-
sized actiCap (Brain Products GmbH, Munich, Germany). 
The signal was amplified using a 32-channel BrainAmp DC 
EEG amplifier, band-pass filtered with a low cut-off at .1 Hz 
and high cut-off at 125 Hz, and digitized at 500 Hz. We strived 
to keep all impedances below 60 kΩ. All electrodes were 
referenced to the left mastoid online with AFz as the ground. 
To record the EEG data, we used Brain Vision Recorder 
software (Brain Products GmbH, Germany).
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EEG data processing
We processed the data in MATLAB (version R2013b, the 
Mathworks, Inc.) using the FieldTrip toolbox (http://www.
fieldtriptoolbox.org/). The EEG data were first time-locked 
to the expected and “update” and “no-update” events and 
segmented into epochs including 500 milliseconds of pre-
stimulus period during which the fixation cross was visible 
and 2000 milliseconds of post-stimulus phase showing either 
the cues or the bee image. 
We were blind to conditions during artifact-rejection. 
To eliminate EEG artifacts such as eye movements, we 
first visually inspected the data, padded for filtering (5 sec 
windows), applied a high-pass filter and performed a baseline 
correction on the entire window. We excluded extremely 
noisy trials and channels before running an independent 
component analyses (ICA) to correct for the eye movement 
artifacts. In order to ensure that eye movement artifacts were 
identified correctly, we visually inspected the components 
using topographic and time course plots to extract eye-
movement components. Then, noisy channels (max. 3 
channels) were interpolated using the nearest channels. 
Subsequently, we visually inspected the data again, excluded 
trials with a kurtosis value greater than 6 and rejected any 
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remaining trials with artifacts before re-referencing the 
electrodes to the linked mastoids. Participants who did not 
provide more than two trials per condition were excluded 
from the final samples. Due to the nature of the experimental 
paradigm and the strict preprocessing procedure, the amount 
of trials per condition was limited. Mean number of trials and 
standard deviations (SD) for all trial types for the final sample 
are shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Mean number of trials and standard deviations (SD) 
for all trial types for the infants in the final sample.
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Mean    SD
6.74    3.19
5.52    3.38
21.57    12.59
7.43    3.91
5.96    3.40
Trial type
Update
No-update
Expected
Bee After Update 
Bee After No-update
Mean number of trials and standard deviations (SD)
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To calculate ERPs, we baseline-corrected the 
preprocessed data using a 200 milliseconds pre-stimulus 
period and applied a .1-30 Hz band-pass filter. We then 
calculated ERP averages per participant per trial type. For the 
Nc component, we calculated the mean amplitude around the 
frontal central channels (i.e. Fz, FCz, Cz, FC1, FC2, C3, F3, 
C4, F4) between 350 to 550 milliseconds based on previous 
infant literature (Striano, Reid, & Hoehl, 2006). For the PSW, 
we computed the mean amplitude around the central-parietal 
channels (i.e. P3, Pz, P4, CP1, CP2, CP5, CP6) during a time 
window of 700 to 1000 milliseconds after stimulus onset (see 
the Introduction). We excluded participants from further 
statistical analyses, if they had a value for one trial deviating 
more than two standard deviations from the overall trial 
average.
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Results
Negative central component (Nc)
We predicted that the cues would elicit an amplified Nc 
response in contrast to the standard stimulus (i.e. the repeated 
bee images), if infants indeed perceive them as unexpected. 
In order to test our hypotheses statistically, we first ran a 
repeated measures ANOVA with trial type (expected, update, 
no-update) as within-subjects factor. Because Mauchly’s Test 
of Sphericity indicated that the assumption of sphericity 
had been violated (p < .05), we used Greenhouse-Geisser 
corrections. This analysis revealed a significant main effect of 
trial type, F (1.46, 27.70) = 4.94, p = .023, η2 = 0.21, suggesting 
that infants showed differential central negativity response 
across different trials.
We ran follow-up tests using the Least Significant 
Differences method for pairwise comparisons of the 
estimated marginal means to investigate further whether the 
differences in amplitudes across different trials were in line 
with our predictions. As hypothesized, data revealed that 
both in the “update” (md = -3.89, SE = 1.17, p = 0.003) and the 
“no-update” trials (md = -5.68, SE = 2.18, p = 0.017), infants 
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showed significantly stronger negativity in comparison to 
the expected trials. There was no significant difference in 
response between “update” and “no-update” trials (md = 1.79, 
SE = 2.03, p = 0.390). Figure 2 illustrates the grand average of 
Nc response for each trial type.
Figure 2: Nc signal averaged across frontal-central electrodes for each 
trial type. Blue line represents expected trials whereas green and red lines 
represent update and no-update trials, respectively. The highlighted window 
represents the Nc. The negativity is plotted downwards.
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Positive slow wave (PSW)
We tested whether infants showed differential responses with 
respect to cues in later components such as PSW. Because 
Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity indicated that the assumption of 
sphericity had been violated (p < .05), we used Greenhouse-
Geisser corrections. A repeated measures ANOVA with trial 
type (expected, update, no-update) as within-subjects factor 
revealed a significant main effect of trial type, F (1.37, 27.45) 
= 4.01, p = .044, η2 = 0.17, indicating that infants’ responses 
in the later components differed between trials.
Based on our hypothesis on updating, we examined 
whether infants dissociated between the unexpected cues and 
showed larger positivity in “update” trials as compared to the 
other trial types. Follow-up tests using the Least Significant 
Differences method for pairwise comparisons of estimated 
marginal means revealed that participants showed more 
positivity in response to both “update” (md = 2.82, SE = 0.88, 
p = 0.004) and the “no-update” trials (md = 4.18, SE = 1.65, 
p = 0.020) as compared to the expected trials. This finding 
suggests that the unexpected information modulated infants’ 
responses in later stages of processing as well.
While infants encoded the unexpected appearance of 
the cues differently than the predicted events, there was no 
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indication that they dissociated between the two types of cues 
(md update vs. no-update = -1.37, SE = 1.82, p = 0.461). This 
implies that infants might have formed a model throughout 
the experiment but does not provide any evidence on whether 
they dissociate between different types of unexpected events 
to update their internal models. Figure 3 illustrates the grand 
average of PSW response for each experimental trial.
Figure 3: PSW signal averaged across central-parietal electrodes for each 
trial type. Blue line represents expected trials whereas green and red lines 
represent update and no-update trials, respectively.  The highlighted window 
represents the PSW. The positivity is plotted upwards.
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Event related potentials in response to 
the images following the cues
The data suggest that infants generated a model on the basis of 
the limited exposure to the current procedure which led them 
to form predictions about the stimuli which, when violated, 
elicited an enhanced neural response. However, there was no 
indication that they dissociated between different forms of 
unexpected information that differentially modulated their 
internal models. To explore the nature of the internal models 
infants might have generated throughout the experiment 
further, we investigated their neural response to the stimuli 
following the “update” and “no-update” cues. These analyses 
allowed us to examine infants’ neural responses with respect 
to the changes or absence of changes in the environment 
signaled by different cues, which would provide further 
information about the content of their models. More 
specifically, the images after the “update” cue were different 
from those in the previous expected trials (i.e. color, location 
and sound changed); whereas, infants observed the same 
stimuli as in the previous expected trials following the “no-
update” cue (see Figure 1). Because there were no differences 
between the images following the “no-update” cue and 
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those preceding expected trials, any differences in ERPs in 
responses to these two images would inform us about how 
infants’ predictions were modulated by the cues. That is to say, 
if infants show increased ERP response to the image following 
the “no-update” cue, this would mean that infants associated 
cues with future changes, therefore, the violations of this 
prediction resulted in increased neural response when they 
observe no change after the cue.
In order to define the differences in response amplitude 
between the images following the cues and the expected 
trials, we calculated two separate difference score measures 
(DS) as used in the literature (Jeste et al., 2015). To obtain 
the first difference score, we subtracted the Nc amplitude in 
response to the images following the “update” cues from the 
Nc amplitude in the expected trials. We followed the same 
procedure to calculate a difference score for the “no-update” 
trials. With a paired sample t-test, we then compared the 
difference scores for these two new conditions. This analysis 
revealed a significant difference between conditions (t (22) = 
3.51, p= 0.002). The difference score in the image after “no-
update” trials (M= -10.63, SD= 9.88) was significantly larger 
than the difference score for the image after “update” trials 
(M= -3.16, SD= 7.37), despite visual differences in the latter 
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but not in the former case.
The significant difference in DS between the image after 
“no-update” and the image after “update” trials is especially 
remarkable since the stimuli before and after the “no-update” 
cues were identical. This finding implies that infants predicted 
a change in the environment following any cue and they 
reacted with an enhanced neural response to the omission 
of this change suggesting a top-down modulation of early 
sensory processing in infants.
We also calculated a difference score (DS) on the 
PSW amplitude in response to the image following the cues 
separately, which we tested statistically with a paired sample 
t-test. This analysis revealed no significant difference between 
conditions (t (22) = 0.03, p= 0.976). Together, these findings 
suggest that infants’ observation of a change or absence of a 
change significantly modulated early processing stages only.
Discussion
We investigated whether 9-month-old infants build predictions 
based on a brief exposure to a sequence of audio-visual events 
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and show error responses when these predictions are violated. 
Moreover, we compared different types of unexpected cues to 
investigate whether infants dissociated them in the extent to 
which they are relevant to modulating their predictive models. 
Infants showed an amplified Nc when a predictable sequence 
was unexpectedly interrupted suggesting that they formed a 
model about the structure of events to make predictions, and 
responded to the violations of these predictions. Unexpected 
appearances of the cues modulated later components as 
well, namely the positive slow wave (PSW). However, data 
revealed no differential response to the two types of cues 
at later stages of processing. Further analyses revealed that 
infants learned to associate the unexpected appearance of 
the cues with future changes in the sequence. Interestingly, 
when a predicted change was absent, a prominent neural 
response was observed suggesting a top-down modulation of 
early sensory processing in infants. Instead of predicting an 
upcoming continuation of the previous pattern as indicated 
by the “no-update” cue, they rather generated one model: 
surprising cues always signal a change in the environment.
We showed that both early and late sensory responses 
were modulated by predictions generated by the infants’ 
internal models. When infants observed a sudden interruption 
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in the predicted sequence of events, they showed a prominent 
Nc response.  These findings suggest that Nc might not only 
reflect involuntary allocation of attention (Reynolds et al., 
2014; Richards, 2003), but might also be indicative of violation 
of predictions in infants. The unexpected appearance of 
the cues modulated late components (i.e. the PSW) as well, 
observed in the posterior regions of the brain. These results 
show similarities with the recent findings in the infant 
literature indicating that late components such as slow waves 
are modulated by unexpected events, potentially representing 
further consolidation of internal models (Kouider et al., 2015). 
Moreover, these findings are also in line with studies in adults 
showing that the P3b observed in posterior channels represents 
adjustments in generative internal models (Marzecová et al., 
2017; Kolossa, Kopp, & Fingscheidt, 2015). These findings 
provide further support to the recent theoretical arguments 
proposing that although internal models advance given 
maturation and increased experience during life span, a basic 
form of a model generation system might be functional early 
in life (Emberson, Richards, & Aslin, 2015). 
In order to understand the model infants might have 
built in the experiment thoroughly, we analyzed their responses 
after they had observed a change in the stimuli (or not) 
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following the cues. Interestingly, early in processing, infants 
showed an enhanced response to the absence of a predicted 
change in the environment. In other words, infants expected 
a change in the sequence following an interruption in the 
sequence (i.e. the sudden appearance of the cue) and showed 
a violation-of-expectation response when they observed the 
same stimuli as before. This suggests that because infants had 
generated a model in which cues signal change, the omission 
of a change resulted in differential neural activity. This finding 
provides further evidence that infants generate models to 
make predictions and these top-down predictions modulate 
sensory processing (Emberson, Richards, & Aslin, 2015; 
Kouider et al., 2015).
One might argue that infants’ neural responses to 
the cues reflect simple adaptation processes rather than the 
modulation of predictive internal models (Garrido et al., 
2009). According to this view, the repetition of the same input 
stimulates the same pathways resulting in the adaptation of 
the synapses, thus, reducing the activation. However, the rare 
stimuli activate unexploited pathways leading to distinguished 
activation (Wacogne et al., 2011). Therefore, it could be that 
infants involuntarily responded to the unexpected stimuli 
and did not generate a predictive model. This interpretation 
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seems to be unlikely because if infants’ responses were not 
modulated by top-down predictions, we would have observed 
no difference in activation patterns following the cues in the 
early components, in particular, after the “no-update” cue. We 
may eliminate a simple adaptation model because the stimuli 
following the “no-update” cue were the same as the stimuli 
in the preceding expected trials. As there was no change in 
the stimuli, no adaptation was required. Thus, these findings 
support the interpretation that infants used available evidence 
to generate a model to make predictions, and these top-down 
predictions modulated their sensory processing. 
Why did infants form expectations based on the 
“update” cue whereas they did not seem to learn what the 
“no-update” cue signaled? First, it might simply be that the 
cues were perceptually too similar, even though they had a 
different shape and were accompanied by a different sound. 
Therefore, infants possibly formed only a single model, namely 
that unexpected cues were followed by a change. It could also 
be that the task in the current study was too demanding for 
9-month-old infants, as they had to associate the unexpected 
cues with a future change in the predicted sequence. In other 
words, infants had to form arbitrary associations between 
two temporally distinct images for the “update” and “no-
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update” trials separately. As studies point out that the ability 
to form arbitrary associations emerges at the end of first year 
and develops during the second year in life (Ghetti, Lyons, 
& DeMaster, 2012), 9-month-old infants might have lacked 
sophisticated working memory skills to perform the current 
task as expected. 
Another answer to this question might be that limited 
cognitive resources might have led infants to process a 
stimulus that did not signal any change in the environment 
(i.e. distractor) to a lesser extent than a stimulus that was 
relevant for the future (Wills et al., 2007). Although infants 
learned that a change would occur in the predicted sequence 
following the “update” cue, they did not have any information 
about how exactly the stimulus would change (i.e. the new 
position, tone and color was unpredictable). However, 
following the “no-update” cue, it was certain that the image 
would be the same as the one in the previous sequence (i.e. 
the same position, tone and color). Because the “update” 
cue represented more uncertainty, hence more information 
gain, than the “no-update” cue, infants might have used this 
cue to form a model about the experimental environment 
in order to use their limited resources maximally (Gottlieb, 
2012).  Analogously, in social learning, infants make use of 
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ostensive cues to predict upcoming a change, which promise 
information gain (Csibra & Gergely, 2009).
In a recent eye-tracking study, we investigated whether 
and how infants (and adults) construct and adjust their 
internal models in a changing environment (Kayhan et al., 
under review). In a saccadic planning paradigm, we showed 
participants (14-month-olds and adults) differently colored 
stimuli that appeared at an unexpected location every few 
trials. The colors indicated whether the subsequent stimulus 
would appear at a new location (i.e. update) or at the same 
location as previously (i.e. no-update). Results showed 
that infants at the age of 14 months did dissociate between 
different types of unexpected events in the extent to which 
they are relevant to modulating their internal models, unlike 
the 9-month-old infants in the current study. 
What can explain the different results of these two 
similar studies? In addition to the differences in the age of 
the participants, there might also have been differences in 
task demands. Whereas in the eye-tracking study, infants 
were required to differentiate between the two types of 
unexpected events to initiate an eye-movement to correct 
target locations to be able to follow the sequence, there was no 
behavioral cost to generating only one model in the current 
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paradigm. Here, we chose to present the cues in the center 
of the screen because we aimed to minimize saccade-related 
artifacts in the EEG response, which might have influenced 
infants’ performance in the task. Because infants did not have 
to dissociate between different types of unexpected events to 
prepare behavioral responses accordingly, they might have 
allocated their resources to form the update model only, as it 
was functionally more relevant as compared to the no-update 
model (i.e. update cue signaled a change in the environment). 
 As Piaget has already pointed out in the past century, 
children build internal models of their environment or 
“schemas”, based on their interactions with the world (Piaget 
& Cook, 1952). They use assimilation and accommodation 
mechanisms to integrate new information into their existing 
schemas to improve them further such that they represent 
the outside world accurately. Although, Piaget’s theoretical 
work has set the stage to interesting research questions, 
recent advances in theoretical and brain sciences provided 
us with cutting-edge tools that greatly extend our knowledge, 
potentially beyond Piaget’s imagination. Using an audio-visual 
EEG paradigm, here, we show that infants generate predictive 
models of the experimental environment based on the 
repeated observations of a sequence of images, and respond 
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to the violations of their predictions when the sequence was 
unexpectedly interrupted. Moreover, our findings reveal 
that when expected environmental changes do not occur, 
infants show an amplified neural response in the early stages 
of processing, suggesting a top-down modulation of early 
sensory processing in 9-month-old infants. These findings 
are important as they corroborate the emerging evidence 
suggesting that the basic machinery to build generative 
models might be functional early on in development.
As children get older, they might advance in generating 
sophisticated internal models of their environment. In Piaget 
terms, development reflects the increases in the number 
and complexity of these schemas that a person learned. 
Relatedly, although a basic system to build predictive internal 
models might be functional already in infancy (Emberson, 
Richards, & Aslin, 2015, Kouider et al., 2015), the capacity 
to form complex models might increase with maturation and 
experience. Once the models advance, more precise and/
or detailed predictions generated by these models might 
be formed (Kwisthout, Bekkering, & van Rooij, 2017). An 
interesting avenue for future work would be to investigate 
whether and how the generative models evolve during the 
first years of life. 
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To summarize, the current study shows that 9-month-
old infants form and update their internal models to represent 
the changes in a dynamic environment. Infants formed 
predictions based on the statistical information and responded 
to the violation of these predictions: when the predicted 
sequence was unexpectedly interrupted by the cues, infants 
showed an amplified negative central (Nc). Late components 
such as the PSW were evoked in response to unexpected events 
as well; however, no differential response to the two types of 
cues was observed at later stages of processing. Moreover, 
data revealed that infants associated unexpected cues with 
future changes in the sequence. Remarkably, when a predicted 
change was omitted, infants responded with an amplified 
neural response suggesting a top-down modulation of early 
sensory processing in infants. These findings contribute to 
the emerging literature suggesting that the basic machinery to 
build generative models might be functional early on in life.
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Abstract
The ability to predict others’ actions enables humans to 
function adaptively in complex social environments. Despite 
being an important capacity, it is still not well understood 
what principles govern young children’s predictions of 
others’ actions. Using an anticipatory looking paradigm, we 
examined to what extent action prediction in 14-, 25- and 
36-month-old children and adults is governed by efficiency 
and frequency principles. Data showed that 14-month-old 
infants’ predictions were governed by a frequency principle 
and their anticipation behavior did not change over the 
trials. Although frequency information also influenced the 
predictions of the older age groups in the first test trial, they 
showed significant changes in their predictions in favor of an 
efficiency principle in the subsequent test trials. This study 
provides insights into the extent to which efficiency and 
frequency principles explain action prediction of individuals 
at different ages.
Keywords: action prediction, efficiency, frequency, 
statistical learning.
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Introduction
From early on in their lives, young children watch their 
environment and the people acting in it. By observing the 
unfolding of events and actions over time, in a wide variety 
of contexts, children develop an ability to predict how events 
and actions happen. This ability enables them to develop 
ways to function adaptively in complex social environments. 
Despite being an important capacity, it is not yet clear what 
principles govern young children’s predictions of others’ 
actions (Choisdealbha & Reid, 2014; Gerson & Woodward, 
2014; Hunnius & Bekkering, 2014). 
In this study, we investigated the contribution of two 
principles to young children’s predictions of others’ actions: 
frequency principle (i.e., the assumption that agents tend to 
act in the same way as they most frequently did before) and 
efficiency principle (i.e., the assumption that agents tend to 
behave in ways that are as efficient as possible). Furthermore, 
we aimed to examine whether and how the relative contribution 
of these two principles to children’s action predictions evolve 
during development, by testing 14-, 25- and 36- month-old 
children as well as adults.
One principle that might underlie how young 
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children understand and predict others’ goal-directed 
actions is efficiency (Gergely & Csibra, 2003). According 
to this framework, human infants have a reality-based, 
interpretational strategy to understand and predict others’ 
actions. The link between an action and a goal state generates 
a non-mentalistic teleological representation of that action, 
which is based on the assumption that agents will act as 
efficiently as possible to achieve their goals, given the 
situational constraints (Gergely & Csibra, 2003).
There is a variety of experimental work supporting 
the argument that from early on in life humans are able to 
establish teleological representations of actions based on an 
efficiency principle, in order to understand goal-directed 
actions of others (Bíró, 2013; Csibra, Bíró, Koós, & Gergely, 
2003; Gredebäck & Melinder, 2011). In the basic experimental 
paradigm (Gergely, Nádasdy, Csibra, & Bíró, 1995), infants 
are habituated to an event in which a small ball approaches 
a large ball by jumping over an obstacle. When the obstacle 
is removed in the test trial, infants show longer looking 
times when they see the circle making a jumping movement 
as compared to a straight move towards the target, which 
is considered as the most efficient action. In other words, 
infants predicted an agent to take the most efficient means to 
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its goal; thus, they were surprised when it performed the now 
inefficient jumping action, although that is what they had 
seen it to do in the past. Many studies using similar violation 
of expectation paradigms found comparable results providing 
support for the notion that infants rely on a principle of 
efficiency to understand goal-directed actions of others 
(Bíró, Verschoor, & Coenen, 2011; Hernik & Southgate, 2012; 
Kamewari, Kato, Kanda, Ishiguro, & Hiraki, 2005; Sodian, 
Schoeppner, & Metz, 2004; Verschoor & Bíró, 2012).
From early on in life, infants build probabilistic 
models that aim to capture the statistical regularities in their 
surroundings (Bulf, Johnson, & Valenza, 2011; Kirkham, 
Slemmer, & Johnson, 2002; Ruffman, Taumoepeau, & Perkins, 
2012; Saffran, Aslin, & Newport, 1996; Saffran, Johnson, 
Aslin, & Newport, 1999). Young children’s sensitivity to 
statistical regularities is also of interest to researchers in 
order to explain action-understanding processes (Baldwin, 
Andersson, Saffran, & Meyer, 2008; Baldwin, Baird, Saylor, 
& Clark, 2001). For example, in their 2001 study, Baldwin 
and colleagues showed that infants use statistical detection 
skills in order to parse continuous action sequences into sub-
actions. In their pioneering work, they familiarized 10- to 
11-month-old infants with sequences of everyday actions such 
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as reaching towards and grasping a kitchen towel and then 
placing it on a towel rack. In the test phase, infants observed 
still-frame pauses either just after the actor completed an 
action (i.e., after grasping the towel) or in the middle of an 
ongoing action (i.e., in the middle of the grasping action). 
Infants looked longer at the interrupted test videos relative 
to the completed ones indicating that infants are sensitive 
to boundaries that match the completion of actions. This 
demonstrates that infants use statistical structure detection 
skills to understand others’ actions (cf. Hunnius & Bekkering, 
2014; Uithol & Paulus, 2014). 
Recent studies investigated the contribution of 
teleological reasoning and statistical learning to children’s 
understanding of goal-directed actions (e.g., Paulus and 
colleagues, 2011; Schuwerk & Paulus, 2015). For example, 
Paulus and colleagues (2011) designed an anticipatory 
looking paradigm that allowed them to examine to what 
extent 9-month-old infants and adults rely on teleological 
reasoning or frequency information when predicting others’ 
actions. They presented 9-month-old infants and adults with 
movies in which an animated cow aimed to reach a sheep 
waiting on the other side of a path. The path diverged into 
two paths at the cow’s initial location and converged into one 
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again at the spot where the sheep was. The paths differed in 
length and one path was clearly longer than the other one. 
In the familiarization phase, participants observed how the 
cow was repeatedly taking the longer path to get to the sheep, 
as the shorter one was broken and thus impassable. In the 
subsequent test phase, both paths were passable and the cow 
was now always taking the shortest path to reach the sheep. 
Paulus and colleagues hypothesized that if adults and infants 
have an expectation of an efficient action, they would anticipate 
the agent to take the short path from the very first test trial 
on, when both paths were passable. However, if participants 
relied on frequency information, they would predict the agent 
to take the short path only after repeated observations of this 
action. The results showed that in the first test trial, when both 
paths were now passable, 9-month-old infants and adults still 
anticipated the agent to take the long path. However, unlike 
adults, infants kept expecting the agent to take the long path 
in the subsequent test trials even after observing that now the 
agent was repeatedly taking the short, more efficient path. 
Adults, on the other hand, rapidly changed their expectations 
and started predicting the agent to take the efficient path to 
reach the other agent. These results suggest that frequency 
information obtained from previous observations dominate 
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expectations of both adults and 9-month-old infants; however, 
adults easily change their expectations about another agent’s 
actions in favor of an efficiency principle.
Paulus and colleagues (2011) thus pointed out the 
role of previous observations on infants’ action predictions. 
However, they also demonstrated that there are differences 
between infants and adults in revising their models based of 
the efficiency of an agent’s actions. Whereas adults changed 
their expectations about the agent’s actions in support of 
an efficiency principle, 9-month-olds infants did not. This 
difference between infants’ and adults’ responses leaves 
open the question of how the principles that explain action 
prediction evolve during development. More specifically, we 
asked to what extent the principles of efficiency and frequency 
(where the probability with which an event is predicted is 
a direct function of the frequency with which it has been 
previously observed) governs action prediction at different 
ages in early development. 
In order to address this question, we conducted an eye-
tracking study using the anticipation paradigm developed 
by Paulus and colleagues (2011). To examine how the 
principles that govern action prediction progress throughout 
development, we tested 14-, 25- and 36-month-old children 
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as well as adults. In the learning phase, participants repeatedly 
observed an agent taking a long path to get to another agent, 
because the shorter path was impassable. In the test phase, 
both paths were passable and participants now observed the 
agent taking the shortest path. 
With this design, we aimed to address two points. 
First, we investigated the predictions participants had in the 
first test trial after observing a change in the agent’s actions 
as compared to the previous learning phase. Second, we 
examined the revision of the models in the subsequent test 
trials. We predicted that if all age groups expected the agent 
to act efficiently, they would predict it to take the shortest 
(i.e. the most efficient) path as soon as it was passable again. 
However, if participants based their predictions on the 
previous observations, they would expect the agent to choose 
the long path in the first test trial. 
Moreover, we predicted a developmental change in 
the relative weight of the efficiency and frequency principles 
in the participants’ predictions of others’ actions. More 
specifically, we expected that frequency information based 
on previous observations would most strongly dominate the 
predictions of younger age groups. However, we also expected 
that as participants get older, they would begin to revise their 
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models in favor of an efficiency principle. The framework 
proposed by Baker, Saxe and Tenenbaum (2009) motivates 
this prediction. In this framework, it has been suggested 
that the causal relations between beliefs, goals and actions 
are represented in a rational model: agents act as rationally 
as possible, given their beliefs about the environment. This 
model is then inverted, using Bayesian inference (i.e., updating 
probabilities as new information is acquired), to understand 
agents’ goals from their actions. This framework describes 
a model-based approach that is supported by a learning 
mechanism, namely Bayesian inference, which is modulated 
by increased experience. Because infants have less experience 
and less knowledge about the world, their predictions would 
be dominated by previous observations, whereas increased 
experience with observing efficient actions would enable 
older children and adults to modify their predictions favoring 
an efficiency principle.
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Method
Participants
Nineteen 14- (M= 14.71 months, 9 girls), nineteen 25- (M= 
24.89 months, 7 girls) and nineteen 36-month-old infants 
(M= 36.31 months, 9 girls) as well as nineteen adults (M= 
21.33 years, 15 females) were included in the final sample. 
One 14-month-old and one adult participant were tested 
but excluded from the final sample for providing no valid 
data. Child participants were recruited from a database of 
volunteer families. All children were born full-term and had 
no reported developmental delays. Adult participants were 
recruited from a database of university students. Participants 
received a small gift in return (an infant book or 10 Euros 
for the infants, 5-Euro-gift vouchers or credit points for the 
adults).
Stimuli and Experimental Design
We used short animated movies as stimulus material that 
featured an agent locomoting through a scene. Movies were 
created in Adobe ImageReady 7.0, and movie sizes were 1280 
x 1024 pixels. The stimulus presentation procedure started 
with a fixation stimulus to direct the participant’s attention 
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to the screen followed by an introductory movie. This 
introductory movie showed how the agent – an animated cow 
– walked along a horizontal path from the right of the screen 
to the middle and returned to the beginning position. Two 
different introductory movies were designed to introduce 
the participants to the agent’s movements and an occlusion 
event (see Figure 1A). The first introductory movie showed 
participants that the agent moved horizontally along the path 
without digressing from it. There was a transparent occluder 
on the horizontal path to demonstrate that the agent continued 
the movement behind the occluder and reappeared from 
behind it. The first movie introduced a transparent occluder, 
and the second movie showed the same movement of the 
agent with an opaque occluder. The first introductory movie 
was shown once, the second one twice, and this introductory 
phase took 23 seconds in total.
After the introduction, the learning phase started. We 
presented participants with a scene in which there was a path 
diverging into two and converging into a single path again. One 
of the two paths was clearly longer than the other one, which 
directly led to the end of the road. An occluder (see Figure 1B 
and 1C) covered the point at which the paths diverged. At the 
beginning, an interaction between two agents was depicted. 
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The main agent, the animated cow, stood on the left side of 
the path. On the other side of the path, there was a sheep, 
and the two animated characters faced each other. The sheep 
wiggled and then left the scene moving to the right side of 
the screen. Then, the cow responded to the sheep by wiggling 
back. This interaction took place in the first 3.5 seconds of 
the movie. Later, the occluder, which had been transparent, 
turned opaque and the cow started walking along the path as 
if it was to move towards the sheep. While moving down the 
path, the cow disappeared under the occluder for 1.5 seconds. 
As the occlusion created an uncertainty about which path 
the agent would take, our aim was to assess the participants’ 
expectations by measuring predictive eye movements to the 
path which they expected the agent to take. 
Whereas one of the two paths was clearly longer than 
the other one, there was a gap in the middle of the short 
path, which made the path impassable for the agent. For this 
reason, the cow always took the long path to get to the sheep 
during the learning phase. After reaching the end of the path, 
the cow also left the scene. One movie lasted 11 seconds, and 
a black screen was shown for 1 second at the end of each 
movie. The learning phase consisted of ten repetitions divided 
into two blocks separated by a brief, unrelated attention-
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getter movie that was stopped by the experimenter when the 
infant’s attention was directed at the screen again. In order 
to ensure that potential differences between participants’ test 
performances are not due to the different number of learning 
trials, we used the same fixed number of learning trials for 
all child participants. The location of the paths on the screen 
was counterbalanced across participants (e.g. the short path 
appeared on either the top or bottom of the screen). The 
learning phase took approximately 2.5 minutes. 
In the test phase, the short path was now passable and 
both paths could be taken to get to the other side of the path 
(see Figure 1C). In the test movies, the agent now each time 
took the short path to reach its goal. One movie lasted 10 
seconds, and a black screen was shown for 1 second at the 
end of each movie. The test movie was shown four times and 
a black screen was presented at the end of each movie. The test 
phase lasted for 44 seconds in total.
The stimulus presentation was identical for infants and 
adults with some small exceptions. Adult stimulus presentation 
started with a fixation image similar to the infant procedure. 
Differently, only one introductory movie was shown instead 
of three, in which the agent walked horizontally along the path 
with the opaque occluder in the middle. Then, we presented 
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adults the same learning movie, in which the short path was 
broken and the agent took the long path each time, eight times 
in a row instead of ten times. There was no attention getter 
between learning movies for adults. Following this, we again 
presented participants with test movies in which both paths 
were passable and the agent took the short path each time. 
Identical to the infant procedure, the test movie was shown 
four times and a black screen was presented at the end of each 
movie. The stimulus presentation for the adult participants 
took 2.2 minutes in total.
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A
B
C
Figure 1: Figure 1A shows examples of the three introductory movies. Figure 
1B shows two key frames from the learning movies. The arrows indicate the 
movement direction. Figure 1C shows three frames from the test movies. The 
rectangles in the second picture in Figure 1C illustrate the approximate position 
and size of the area of interests. The third picture shows a frame from the time 
period after the occlusion of the agent. Adapted from “The Role of Frequency 
Information and Teleological Reasoning in Infants’ and Adults’ Action 
Prediction” by Paulus et al. (2011). Developmental Psychology, 47(4) p.978 © 2011 
American Psychological Association.
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Procedure
Eye movements were measured with an infrared corneal 
reflection eye-tracker (TOBII 1750, Tobii Technology, 
Danderyd, Sweden) recording gaze data at 50 Hz with an 
average accuracy of 0.5° visual angle. We used a 9-point 
calibration procedure. The procedure was repeated if seven 
or fewer calibration points were detected. In order to avoid 
visual interference, room lights were turned off during the 
calibration as well as during the testing procedures. Adult 
participants sat on a chair in front of the eye-tracker, whereas 
child participants were seated on their parent’s lap. All 
participants viewed the testing material at approximately 60 
cm distance.
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Measures
Our dependent measure was the anticipatory fixations to the 
areas of interest (AOIs) made during occlusion of the agent 
in the test movies. We determined one same-sized (282 x 
438 pixels) area of interest on each path (Figure 1C). A visual 
anticipation was defined as the first fixation to one of the 
AOIs before the agent reappeared from behind the occluder. 
Per trial, we first defined whether an anticipation was made 
during the time when the agent was occluded and to which 
AOI. If an anticipation was made to the short path, we assigned 
the value of -1 for that trial. On the other hand, if there was 
an anticipation to the long path, we assigned the value of 1 
for that trial. If no visual anticipation occurred, the trial was 
given the value 0 and was excluded from the analyses.
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Statistical Analyses
To examine on which path participants expected the agent to 
reappear in the first test trial, we calculated the proportion of 
anticipations to the long and to the short paths in the first test 
trial for all age groups. Then, we ran exact binomial tests for 
each age group to test if the proportion of anticipations in the 
first test trial significantly differed from chance. 
Regarding the developmental changes in the revision 
of predictions over the course of trials, we used Generalized 
Estimating Equation (GEE). GEE is a method that allows 
analyzing data in repeated measures designs when the 
outcome variable is binary (Ballinger, 2004; Hanley, 
Negassa, & Forrester, 2003). Because our data set consisted 
of potentially correlated data points from one individual, 
we used a GEE to control for the effects of the dependence 
between these observation points. One other reason to use 
this method instead of repeated measures ANOVA was that 
we did not have to exclude participants with missing data on 
one or more trials. 
The Contribution of Efficiency and Frequency 
Principles to Children’s Models of Other’s Actions
132
Results
We investigated which path the different age groups predicted 
the agent to take during test trials. First, we examined 
participants’ predictions in the first test trial. In this trial, 
participants were confronted with a changed situation (i.e. 
both paths were now passable) for which they had no previous 
information about the agent’s actions. Figure 2 shows the 
proportion of anticipations to the short and long paths in the 
first test trial in each age group.
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Figure 2: The proportion of anticipations to the short and long path in the first 
test trial for each age group. Gray bars indicate the percentage of anticipations 
to the long path and the black bars indicate the percentage of anticipations to 
the short path.
Results demonstrated that 47 % of the 14-month-olds 
made an anticipatory fixation in the first test trial, and 78 % of 
these fixations were to the long path. An exact binomial test 
revealed that the proportion of anticipations to the long path 
in the first test trial did not significantly differ from chance 
(i.e., 50 %) for this age group (p = .18). Among the 25-month-
olds, 79 % made an anticipatory fixation in the first trial, and 
80% of these fixations were to the long path. An exact binomial 
test indicated that this proportion was significantly different 
from chance (p = .03). Furthermore, 68 % of the 36-month-
olds made an anticipatory fixation in the first test trial, and 
77 % of their fixations were to the long path (p =. 09). Finally, 
data revealed that during the first test trial, 90% of the adult 
participants made an anticipation, 78 % of which was to the 
long path (p =. 03). These results demonstrate that participants 
based their predictions on frequency information when there 
was an uncertainty about the agent’s next action, which is 
especially evident in the responses of 25- and 36-month-olds 
as well as adults. 
Second, we investigated whether participants took into 
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account the new information they received (i.e., the agent 
now taking the short path) and altered their predictions 
accordingly, meaning that they started to predict the agent to 
reappear on the short path from the second trial on. Figure 
3 provides descriptive information about the anticipatory 
fixations of different age groups over the four test trials. In the 
figure, it can be seen that as participants get older, they start to 
anticipate increasingly more to the short path over the course 
of the test trials.
Figure 3: The proportion of anticipations for all age groups over all test trials. 
Gray bars indicate the percentage of anticipations to the long path and the 
black bars indicate the percentage of anticipations to the short path. From left 
to right: the proportion of anticipations made by 14-, 25, and 36-month-old 
children and adults.
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To statistically test whether infants and adults improved 
in anticipating the path that the agent took throughout the 
four test trials, we ran a GEE analysis. The trials (i.e., 1 to 4) 
and the participants’ age (i.e., 14-, 25-, 36-month-old and 
adult) were entered into the model as predictor variables 
and the main effects and the interactions of these variables 
on the frequency of anticipations (to the short or long path) 
were investigated. In this GEE analysis, we used a binomial 
distribution and logit link function with an auto-regressive 
working correlation matrix (AR(1); Gosho, 2014; Vens & 
Ziegler, 2012) and a Least Significant Differences method for 
pairwise comparisons of the estimated marginal means.
The GEE revealed a main effect of Trial (Wald χ2 (3) = 
17.77, p < .001). Pairwise comparisons showed that there was 
a significant mean difference in the frequency of anticipations 
between the first test trial and the rest of the test trials (mdtrial 
1 and 2 = .33, SE = .08, p = .000; mdtrial 1 and 3 = .33, SE = .10, p 
= .001; mdtrial 1 and 4 = .39, SE = .09, p = .000). This finding 
indicates that participants more often predicted the agent to 
take the long path in the first test trial, but started to alter their 
predictions from the second trial on and more often predicted 
the agent to reappear on the short path.  
Moreover, the main effect of Age (Wald χ2 (3) = 10.29, 
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p = .016) was also significant, indicating that there was a 
difference in the anticipation behavior between age groups. 
Pairwise comparisons showed that the 14-month-olds 
significantly differed from the other age groups (md14- and 
36-month-olds = .32, SE = .12, p = .011; md14-month-olds and adults = .42, 
SE = .12, p = .001), whereas the difference between 14- and 
25-month-olds was marginal (md14- and 25-month-olds  = .21, SE 
= .11, p = .060). There was no significant mean difference 
between the anticipation behavior of 25- and 36-month-
olds (md25- and 36-month-olds = .11, SE = .12, p = .382), but this 
difference was marginally significant for 25-month-olds and 
adults (md25-month-olds and adults = .21, SE = .12, p = .080). Finally, 
the mean difference in anticipations between 36-month-olds 
and adults was not significant (md36-month-olds and adults = .10, 
SE = .13, p = .439). These findings indicate that age groups 
differed in their overall anticipation tendencies. Especially 
the 14-month-olds showed significant differences in their 
anticipation behavior, compared to the other age groups, as 
they made more anticipations to the long path over the course 
of the test trials. In addition, at 36 months of age, children’s 
anticipation behavior did not differ significantly from adults. 
Lastly, the interaction effect between trial and age was not 
significant (Wald χ2 (9) = 10.31, p = .326). 
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Although the interaction between trial and age was not 
significant, given our a priori developmental hypothesis and 
the pattern of results illustrated in Figure 3, we examined 
the effect of Trial on anticipations in more detail and ran 
separate GEE analyses for each age group. We entered Trial 
as a predictor variable, and used a binomial distribution and 
logit link function with an AR (1) working correlation matrix 
and a Least Significant Differences method for pair wise 
comparisons of the estimated marginal means.
The GEEs for 14- and 25-month-olds did not reveal 
significant main effects of Trial (Wald χ2 (3) = 5.12, p = .164; 
Wald χ2 (3) = 5.98 p = .113, respectively) on anticipations. 
This result suggests that these two age groups did not show 
a significant change in their anticipation behavior over the 
course of trials. The GEE for 36-month-olds showed a main 
effect of Trial on anticipations (Wald χ2 (3) = 13.22, p = .004) 
indicating a significant change in the anticipation behavior 
over the course of trials. Pairwise comparisons showed 
that 36-month-olds showed significant revisions in their 
anticipations after they observed a difference in the agent’s 
action. More specifically, they started to predict the agent to 
take the short path from the second trial on (mdtrial 1 and 2 = .27, 
SE = .14, p = .064; mdtrial 1 and 3 = .49, SE = .13, p = .000; mdtrial 1 
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and 4 = .39, SE = .15, p = .011). Also the GEE for adults revealed 
a significant main effect of Trial (Wald χ2 (3) = 17.41, p = .001) 
demonstrating a significant change in their predictions on 
the agent’s action. Pairwise comparisons showed that adults 
started to predict the agent to take the short path immediately 
after they observed it taking the short path in the first test trial 
(mdtrial 1 and 2 = .43, SE = .15, p = .003; mdtrial 1 and 3 = .65, SE = 
.11, p = .000; mdtrial 1 and 4 = .57, SE = .12, p = .000). 
Discussion
In this study, we examined to what extent efficiency and 
frequency principles explain how individuals predict another 
agent’s actions at different ages. Participants repeatedly 
observed an agent taking a longer path to reach another agent 
when a shorter path was impassable, which was followed by 
test trials in which both the short and the long path were 
passable, and the agent now took the short path repeatedly. 
We focused on two points: the adaptation of predictions in 
the first test trial after a change in the environment and the 
subsequent revisions of predictions in the following trials.
Chapter 4
139
Results of the first test trial showed that all age groups 
predicted the agent to take the long path again, although 
both paths were now available. This result suggests that 
participants of all ages generated a model to make predictions 
about the agent’s actions based on previous observations. This 
finding relates to a number of recent studies and theoretical 
approaches pointing to the role of statistical learning in action 
prediction (e.g., Baldwin et al., 2008; Ruffman et al., 2012; 
Schuwerk & Paulus, 2015). Although all age groups relied 
on their previous observations to make predictions, there 
were age differences in their overall anticipation tendencies. 
A detailed look at the overall changes in the anticipation 
behavior during test trials revealed that only older age groups 
modified their anticipation behavior over the course of trials. 
The data showed that 14-month-old infants formed a 
model of the agent’s actions based on previous observations. 
However, when this model had to be revised, hence the 
predictions, infants did not show any indication of revising 
their model (and their predictions thereof). Our data from 
14-month-olds showed clear similarities with the results 
obtained from 9-month-olds in the Paulus et al. (2011) 
study. These findings provide further evidence that previous 
observations are the main source infants rely on when 
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predicting the actions of others. On the other hand, our 
results showed that older age groups improved in modifying 
their predictions over the course of test trials. For example, 
36-month-old children and adults showed significant changes 
in their anticipation behavior after they realized that the agent 
was acting differently than observed previously. Although 
they expected the agent to reappear on the long path in the 
first test trial, overall these age groups made more fixations to 
the short path during the test trials. These results indicate that 
36-month-olds and adults made significant changes in their 
anticipation behavior over the course of the experiment in 
favor of an efficiency principle. Taken together, these findings 
suggest that the principles that govern how individuals predict 
others’ actions evolve during development.
The increasing amount of visual experience with 
efficient actions over the life span might be one factor that 
could explain the developmental differences we observed in 
the anticipations of different age groups. It is widely accepted 
that young children benefit from their observations to 
understand the actions of others, especially actions that they 
cannot yet perform themselves (Hunnius & Bekkering, 2014). 
We, as adults, provide children with many occasions in which 
they observe us taking the most efficient means to reach our 
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goals. For example, imagine a child watching his father at the 
breakfast table reaching for a cup of coffee. Presumably, if 
there is no obstacle that hinders this movement, the father 
will make a straight move using his right hand, if the cup is on 
the right side in space, in order to reach the cup. A child who 
observes similar events repeatedly can generate predictions 
about the efficiency of his father’s actions using statistical 
inference models. In other words, repeated observations of a 
straight right hand movement, when the object (i.e., the cup) 
is in the right side in space, enable the child to detect a regular 
pattern in the adult’s action that functions effectively to reach 
the goal (i.e., to grab the cup). Thus, older children and adults 
might be better at changing their predictions, affording them 
to favor an efficiency principle when applicable, due to the 
increased amount of observational experience on efficient 
actions, as they get older.
In addition, it is possible that with motor development 
progressing, children become more capable of controlling 
their own actions, which might help them to act more 
efficiently themselves. For example, Paulus and Sodian (2015) 
presented 18- and 24-month-old infants with a set-up in which 
they could choose between a short and a long path to reach 
their mothers. In the first experiment, they demonstrated 
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that children spontaneously selected the shorter, thus more 
efficient, path to reach their goals. In the second experiment, 
the short path was initially blocked and children took the long 
path to reach their goals. Later in test trials, when both paths 
were passable, children gradually switched their behavior 
and started to take the shorter path to reach their goals. 
Despite the evidence that young children select the most 
efficient means to reach their goals, more evidence is needed 
to understand whether their active action experience allow 
them to distinguish between efficient and inefficient actions 
when they observe them in others (Skerry, Carey, & Spelke, 
2013) and whether they predict that others will act efficiently 
to reach their goals. As the current study was not specifically 
designed to address these issues, the role of observational 
and active experience for the use of an efficiency principle 
to predict others’ actions remains an open, but interesting 
question. Future studies should directly address how active 
and observational experiences affect the attributions of 
efficiency during development.
One might argue that our results are at least partly 
driven by a general improvement in inhibition skills that is not 
necessarily based on an efficiency principle. It might be that 
a general improvement in inhibition of a previous strategy 
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allowed older children and adults to perform successfully 
in our task.  As Paulus and colleagues (2011) pointed out 
previously, such explanations do not directly address the 
anticipation behavior of the participants. For example, it has 
been shown that perseverative errors, such as the A-not-B, 
are manifest in children’s reaching behavior, but not in their 
looking behavior (Diamond, 1991; Hofstadter & Reznick, 
1996). Since we used eye-tracking methodology to measure 
participants’ predictive eye movements, there seems to be 
no direct evidence supporting the argument that age-related 
differences in predictions reflect a general improvement in 
motor perseveration skills rather than an efficiency principle. 
Alternatively, one might argue that improvements 
in a general mechanism such as updating explain the 
developmental differences we observe in anticipation patterns, 
allowing older children and adults to show more flexibility 
in changing their predictions. (Davidson, Amso, Anderson, 
& Diamond, 2006; Durston & Casey, 2006). We propose that 
such an argument does not necessarily exclude explanations 
based on efficiency or frequency, as these principles benefit 
from a general improvement in updating or learning. 
Formulating action understanding and action prediction in 
terms of Bayesian inference, as suggested by Baker, Saxe and 
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Tenenbaum (2009), situates a mechanism such as updating in 
the center of the explanation that could be used to describe 
efficiency attributions. This emphasis on Bayesian inference 
and learning supports the argument that increased experience 
with observing others acting efficiently (or rationally) would 
shape predictions favoring an efficiency principle. The more 
evidence is accumulated through repeated observations 
favoring efficiency as development continues, the stronger 
these expectations become. Therefore, it might be that 
improvements in updating to accommodate new information 
might underlie the developmental differences in the current 
study. More research is needed to understand the specific 
underlying mechanism driving the age-related differences in 
children’s models of others’ actions.
One could further argue that the current design 
empowers the use of frequency information since participants 
observe the agent taking the long path more often than they 
observe it taking the short path. Indeed, our design addresses 
the significance of detecting statistical regularities in the 
environment to build a model to predict others’ goal-directed 
actions in uncertain situations. This framework also points 
out how within the experiment learning could influence 
spontaneous predictions of participants. A modeling and 
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simulation work by van Overwalle (2010) addresses this point 
and provides further insight on the importance of learning 
and habituation trials in experimental designs. 
In his 2010 study, van Overwalle simulated the 
traditional teleological reasoning experiments using a 
connectionist model in order to figure out the minimal 
representational and processing demands for an efficiency 
principle. For this purpose, he simulated a network that 
included representing trajectories and an inanimate agent 
moving along the trajectories. He simulated two types of 
habituation trials, either “plausible” jumping which included 
a habituation to the jumping movement over an obstacle or 
“implausible” jumping habituation in which the jumping 
movement was performed in the absence of an obstacle. These 
phases were followed by the exact same test trials as in the 
original Gergely et al. (1995) study including either a jumping 
or a straight movement. After each test trial, the prediction of 
the network was tested by activating the predefined units and 
recording the activations of the trajectories. 
Results of this simulation replicated the findings in the 
original study meaning that the simulation predicted a longer 
looking time at the jumping movement without an obstacle 
after a habituation to a jumping movement with an obstacle. 
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However, an opposite trend was observed for the trials that 
included a habituation to a jumping movement in the absence 
of an obstacle, meaning that a straight-line movement was 
more unexpected in this case. This simulation shows that the 
expectations of the network are likely not based on a default 
notion of efficiency; instead, they emerge from previous 
familiarization with trajectories and learned connections. 
Given this insight from a modeling approach and the results 
of the current study, future studies should be designed 
with different learning phases or without any learning or 
habituation phases to examine participants’ spontaneous 
predictions on efficiency and their subsequent learning over 
trials. Such work is needed to gain more knowledge on the 
role of the notion of efficiency in young children’s action 
predictions. 
To summarize, in this study, we examined the role 
of efficiency and frequency principles in explaining action 
prediction across different age periods. Our results showed 
that the predictions of younger age groups were influenced 
by frequency information. In addition, older age groups 
showed indications of revising their predictions in favor of 
an efficiency principle. More work is needed to provide a 
coherent view on what kind of principles explain the models 
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young children use to predict other’s actions.
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Abstract
From early on in life, children are able to use information 
from their environment to form predictions about events. 
For instance, they can use statistical information about a 
population to predict the sample drawn from that population 
and infer an agent’s preferences from systematic violations 
of random sampling. We investigated how young children 
build and update models of an agent’s sampling actions over 
time, and whether a computational model based on the causal 
Bayesian network formalization of Predictive Processing can 
explain this process.  
We formalized three hypotheses about how different 
explanatory variables (i.e., prior probabilities, current 
observations, and agent characteristics) are used to build 
predictive models of others’ actions. We measured pupillary 
responses as a behavioral marker of ‘prediction errors’ (i.e., 
the perceived mismatch between what one’s model of an agent 
predicts and what the agent actually does), as described in 
the Predictive Processing framework. Pupillary responses of 
24-month-olds, but not 18-month-olds, showed that young 
children integrated information about current observations, 
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priors and agents to generate predictive models of agents and 
their actions. 
These findings shed light on the mechanisms behind 
toddlers’ inferences about agent-caused events. To our 
knowledge, this is the first study in which young children’s 
pupillary responses are used as markers of prediction errors, 
and explained by a computational model based on the causal 
Bayesian network formalization of Predictive Processing. We 
argue that the Predictive Processing framework provides a 
promising explanation of the way in which young children 
process other persons’ actions.
Keywords: predictive models, development, pupil 
dilation, prediction error, causal Bayesian networks.
Introduction
From a very young age, children are able to infer that 
some events are more probable than others. They use these 
inferences to form expectations about future events and 
show surprise when these events unfold differently. When 
12-month-old infants see a container in which three identical 
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objects and a single object move around before one of them 
exits the container, they look longer when the single object 
leaves the container rather than one of the majority objects 
(Téglás, Girotto, Gonzalez, & Bonatti, 2007). A similar 
situation occurs when young children observe more or less 
probable actions of another person. Xu and Garcia (2008) 
showed that infants as young as eight months of age look 
longer at a sample of colored balls if it is picked from a 
population of balls with mostly other colors, suggesting that 
they were expecting a different sample given the population. 
In other words, if a population contains mainly red balls, 
infants expect sampling from the population to be random, 
resulting in a sample of mainly red balls. If this expectation 
is violated, this is reflected in an increased looking time. If, 
however, an agent consistently picks the same items from a 
population in a non-random way (e.g., all white balls from a 
predominantly red population), the observer might interpret 
this as an indication of a preference for a certain item. In a 
study by Kushnir, Xu, and Wellman (2010), 20-month-old 
children observed an agent picking five toys of the same type 
from a population box that held mostly toys from a different 
type. When the toddlers were then asked to give the agent 
the toy he liked best, they often chose the toy that the agent 
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picked before. If, on the other hand, the agent had picked the 
same toys from a population box in which the two types of 
toys were more evenly distributed, they picked this toy less 
often. These results suggest that infants infer preferences of 
others based on violation of random sampling. 
The idea that inferences about the probability of events 
are used to generate predictions about these events is in line 
with the Predictive Processing framework. According to this 
framework, we build generative models to predict incoming 
information (Clark, 2013; Friston, 2005). This predicted input 
is compared to the actual input, and the difference (i.e., the 
prediction error) is used to update the predictive models. 
Previous studies have showed neural markers of prediction 
errors (e.g., Egner, Monti, & Summerfield, 2010; den Ouden, 
Daunizeau, Roiser, Friston, & Stephan, 2010; Phillips, 
Blenkmann, Hughes, Bekinschtein, & Rowe, 2015; van Pelt et 
al., 2016; Wacongne et al., 2011). Other studies suggest that 
prediction errors can also be assessed through measurements 
of pupillary responses, as these have been shown to correlate 
with prediction errors in a predictive-inference task (Nassar 
et al., 2012) and with reward prediction errors (Preuschoff, ‘t 
Hart, & Einhäuser, 2011) in adults. Here, we take a novel step 
by using pupillary responses as indirect behavioral markers of 
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prediction errors in young children. 
If young children build a predictive model of other 
people’s actions in which the probability of events is 
represented, then we would expect to see increased pupil 
dilation when children observe improbable events. Looking 
times may be expected to increase in a similar way. Although 
they are indeed the most widely used measure of prediction 
violations (Aslin, 2007), they are often measured over 
relatively long periods after stimulus presentation (e.g., 
> 12 sec in Wellman et al. (2016); > 5 sec in Xu & Garcia, 
2008; > 6 sec in Xu & Denison, 2009). As such, it is difficult 
to distinguish between initial time-locked responses to the 
violation of predictions and cumulative responses that might 
reflect post-hoc processes (Jackson & Sirois, 2009). The shorter 
time scale at which pupillary responses occur may provide 
unique insights into how different explanatory variables are 
used to form predictions over time. In order to explain the 
mechanism behind infants’ responses, we compared the 
qualitative pattern of pupillary responses to prediction error 
patterns as generated by a Predictive Processing model. 
In the current study, we investigated how 18-month-old 
infants and 24-month-old toddlers build predictive models 
of others’ actions. Do they, as suggested by previous studies, 
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integrate information about prior probabilities and current 
observations to predict a subsequent event? Moreover, is the 
fact that the agent performing the action might have a bias 
also taken into account? In an experiment in which young 
children observed an agent performing a series of more or 
less probable sampling actions, we analyzed the changes in 
pupillary responses over trials to examine in a fine-grained 
manner how infants and toddlers build a model about an 
agent’s sampling actions. 
We created an experimental setting in which children 
observed a puppet drawing balls from a population box and 
placing them in a row in an open container one by one. The 
population box contained balls of two colors, with a ratio of 
1:4. In the Minority-first condition, the puppet first performed 
a series of improbable actions by picking four colored balls of 
the minority color, before picking a ball in the majority color. 
In the Majority-first condition, the puppet performed a series 
of more probable actions by drawing four balls of the majority 
color, followed by one minority color ball. 
We present three formalized hypotheses to explain how 
young children build predictive models of others’ sampling 
actions. These formalized hypotheses (of which the precise 
computational characterization is presented in the Appendix) 
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provided us with a predicted pattern of prediction errors in 
all trials and conditions. We assume that in our experimental 
setup, there are three variables that are used to model the 
environment: (1) the previous observations (i.e. the balls that 
were sampled before), (2) the prior probabilities of an event 
(i.e. the probability of balls of a certain color being picked given 
the relative number of balls in a population), (3) the agent’s 
biases (i.e. tendency to pick a certain color). These variables 
increase in terms of level of complexity: whereas the first one 
is dependent on change detection, the second one relies on 
statistical inference, and the third one is based on processing 
of unobservable agent information. The hypotheses differ 
with respect to whether and how these variables are taken 
into account. 
According to the first hypothesis, children build a 
predictive model solely based on the sample drawn so far. In 
other words, if a green ball were drawn from the population 
before, the best prediction of the next event would be that 
another green ball would be drawn. As evidence builds up, this 
prediction gets stronger, resulting in decreasing prediction 
errors over the course of trials. However, when the last ball 
differs from the previous ones, this should lead to an increase 
in prediction errors. As a result, over time, one would observe 
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a decrease in pupillary responses in both the Minority-first 
and Majority-first conditions, as several balls of the same 
color are being picked repeatedly (see Figure 1A). However, 
when the last ball differs from the previous ones, one would 
expect the pupillary response to increase for the last sampling 
event as compared to the previous event in both conditions. 
In the first hypothesis, information about the fact that the ball 
was sampled from a population with a specific distribution or 
sampled by an agent who may have certain biases is assumed 
not to be taken into account.
The second hypothesis predicts that children do take 
probabilistic information about the population into account, 
but still ignore the information about the agent. This hypothesis 
entails that children use both prior probability and current 
observations to predict the next sampling event: a green ball 
picked from a mostly yellow population is improbable, but 
becomes slightly more probable after it happened a few times. 
Based on this hypothesis, one would expect the pupillary 
responses for the first two trials to be large for the Minority-
first condition. However, when balls of the same color are 
picked repeatedly, the pupillary responses should decrease 
in the subsequent trials. Yet, when the last ball differs from 
the previous observations but it is more probable given the 
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distribution of colors in the population box, we expected the 
pupillary responses to increase only slightly from the fourth 
to the fifth sampling event. In the Majority-first condition, on 
the other hand, one would expect the pupillary responses to 
be lower in the initial trials, as compared to the Minority-first 
condition, given that it is more probable to pick yellow balls 
from the given population box. However, because the last ball 
is different from the previous ones and it is less probable given 
the ratio of balls in the population box, we predicted a larger 
increase in the pupillary responses from the fourth to the fifth 
sampling event in Majority-first condition as compared to the 
Minority-first condition (see Figure 1B).
According to the third hypothesis, children do not only 
process the sampling actions as probabilistic events, but they 
also consider unobservable variables such as an agent’s bias 
while doing so. They integrate the prior probability and current 
observations in a way that includes agent characteristics as an 
explanatory variable that predicts observed actions. If an agent 
consistently performs an improbable action, then sampling 
might not be random but driven by some characteristics of 
the agent (e.g., a bias for picking a certain color). In terms of 
experimental findings, this hypothesis predicts that children 
show larger pupillary responses in the Minority-first condition, 
Chapter 5
159
as compared to the Majority-first condition, during the first 
trials, because it is less probable to pick the minority balls 
repeatedly from the population box. Then, as several minority 
balls are selected in a row in the Minority-first condition, the 
joint probability of the events as a whole becomes so low that 
children will update their models. As a result, pupil dilation 
should decrease after the first few trials, as they will then 
assume that the agent deliberately selects balls in minority 
colors because of a picking bias and will expect the agent to 
keep doing this, consistent with this picking bias. However, as 
the last ball differs from the first four, their predictions based 
on the updated model will be violated and there will be a large 
increase in the pupillary responses again in this condition. 
On the other hand, in the Majority-first condition, there is 
no reason to reject the assumption that the agent samples 
randomly. Therefore, neither the fact that majority colors are 
being picked in a row nor the color of the last ball deviates 
from the previous ones is too surprising: the distribution of 
colors in the sample is consistent with the distribution in the 
population. If this is the case, the pupillary responses in the 
first few trials in Majority-first condition will be lower than in 
the Minority-first condition and they will only slightly increase 
in the last trial as compared to the previous trial, as the last 
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balls differs from the previous observations (see Figure 1C).  
A
B
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Figure 1: The estimated size of the prediction error (and pupil dilation thereof) 
for the two experimental conditions as predicted by the computational models, 
based on Hypothesis 1 (A), Hypothesis 2 (B), and Hypothesis 3 (C).
Children’s predictive models of other’s actions may 
become more precise over the course of development. 
For example, they might get more precise in representing 
statistical information, as they get older. It could also be that 
given the increased amount of social experience, they might 
become more proficient in recognizing others’ preferences. 
Indeed, developmental research on social cognition suggests 
that children’s attributions in social situations change as they 
accumulate more statistical evidence about agents in different 
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situations through experience (Meltzoff & Gopnik, 2013; 
Gopnik & Wellman, 2012). For example, Ma and Xu (2011) 
investigated whether 24-month-old toddlers and 16-month-
old infants use statistical information to infer that others 
might have preferences different from their own. Although 
24-month-olds first assumed that the experimenter would 
share their preference for a certain object, they were able to 
revise this assumption when the experimenter repeatedly 
chose another object, only if sampling appeared to be non-
random. Whereas 24-month-old children were able to infer 
that the experimenter had a preference different from their 
own, 16-month-old infants showed weaker evidence for such 
an inference. As Ma and Xu (2011) argue, these findings 
suggest that the ability to reason about the subjective nature 
of preferences develops between 16 months and 2 years of age. 
Given the previous literature, we included two age groups (24- 
and 18-month-olds) in the current experiment to investigate 
if the use of probabilistic and agent information in generating 
predictive models changes between 18 and 24 months. 
The hypotheses described earlier were formalized based 
on the Predictive Processing framework. Their computational 
elaboration can be found in the Appendix. These formalizations 
provide us with an estimation of prediction errors in different 
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trials and conditions. We compared these predicted patterns 
of results to the actual changes in pupil dilation for both age 
groups. With this, we provide more insight into the way in 
which children use prior probabilities, current observations 
and agent information to build predictive models of others’ 
actions, and how they revise their models over time.    
Method
Participants
We tested 48 18-month-old infants (M = 18 months 2 
days; range 17 months 11 days–18 months 13 days) and 57 
24-month-infants (M = 24 months 1 day; range 23 months 4 
days–24 months 15 days) for the study. Ten 18-month-olds 
and six 24-month-olds did not complete the testing session 
due to fussiness. Participants were recruited from a database 
of volunteer families. The local Social Science Faculty’s ethical 
committee approved the study. All children were born full-
term and had no reported developmental delays. Participating 
families received a book or 10 Euros in return.
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Stimuli
We created familiarization and test movies that showed animal 
hand puppets sampling colored balls from a population box 
and placing them one by one in an open container. The 
population box was transparent in front and had a white 
opaque cover on top in order to hide the sampling action. 
This part also served as an occluder to keep the puppets out of 
sight when they left the scene each time after they had drawn 
a ball from the population box. An opaque tube that was 
attached to the box led to the container on the left side of the 
box (see Figure 2 A-C).
Familiarization movie
In the familiarization movie (Figure 2A), a frog puppet popped 
up from behind the occluded part of the population box and 
started an introductory talk dubbed by a female voice. The 
puppet introduced itself and presented the population box, 
the tube and the container to the child. It then popped down 
to pick a ball from a population box filled with only blue balls 
before appearing again and moving towards the tube. The 
puppet’s hands and the ball were hidden behind the opaque 
part on top of the box until it put the ball into the tube. The 
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puppet then quickly left the scene so that distraction was 
minimized during the measurement of the pupillary response 
in test trials. Immediately after the puppet disappeared, a 
rolling sound was played and the ball appeared on the left side 
of the container. The rolling ball was not shown to the viewer 
in order to ensure that participants did not see its color until it 
appeared in the container. The puppet then popped up again 
and explained that the balls roll all the way down to the end, 
in order to familiarize the child with the sudden appearance 
of the balls in the container. This process was repeated for five 
times and took 2.07 minutes in total.
Test movies
Four different animal hand puppets, dubbed by two male and 
two female voices, were used to depict the different sampling 
events. We filmed each puppet for the Majority-first as well as 
for the Minority-first condition to counterbalance the sampling 
events and the associated agents across participants. Test 
movies (see Figure 2 B-C) were similar to the familiarization 
movie in terms of the set-up. However, the population box 
was now filled with balls in two different colors. In all movies, 
there was a 1:4 ratio of green and yellow balls.
  As in the familiarization movie, the puppet gave a 
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short introduction in which it told the participants its name, 
explored the set-up and explained that it would now pick a 
ball. Then, it popped down behind the white opaque part 
to pick a ball. At this point, the agent was not visible but a 
rumbling sound was presented while the balls moved inside 
the population box in order to indicate that the agent was 
picking a ball. Because the puppet was not visible during this 
sampling event, it was not obvious from the way in which 
the sampling action was performed whether it was random 
or not. The puppet then popped up from behind the opaque 
part, carried the ball, and put the ball into the tube. During 
this period, the ball that the puppet picked was still not visible 
to the participants. Immediately after the puppet left the 
scene, a rolling sound started lasting for 1400 milliseconds 
until the ball appeared on the left side of the container. The 
display of the sampled ball was shown for 4000 milliseconds. 
The puppet repeated the same process five times, picking 
balls one by one from the box. In the Minority-first condition, 
children observed the puppet drawing the minority color balls 
from the population box four times in a row before picking 
one majority color ball (see Figure 2B). In the Majority-first 
condition, the puppet drew four majority color balls followed 
by a minority color ball (see Figure 2C). We measured changes 
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in pupil dilation after each sampling event. Majority-first and 
Minority-first conditions were shown twice to all participants. 
However, as most participants got distracted quickly after 
observing the first entire sampling event, only data for this 
first sampling event were included in the analyses. In this way, 
we also ensured that carry-over effects that might occur due 
to the repetition of sampling sequences would not influence 
our data. One test movie lasted for 1.48 minutes and the entire 
stimulus presentation lasted for 8 minutes.
The stimulus material was edited in post-production 
using Final Cut Studio 3 (Apple Inc.). The movies were further 
edited using open source video editor software Kdenlive 
(version 0.9.6) to match the timing and the durations of 
each movie. In order to ensure that the movies had similar 
luminance values, we color-corrected the movies using Color 
software (version 1.5, Apple Inc.). The audio material for the 
movies was recorded and edited to match the pitch and speed 
of the audio material between movies using Audacity software 
(version 2.0.5).
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Figure 2: Snapshots from stimulus movies of the (A) Familiarization, (B) 
Minority-first condition, and (C) Majority-first condition
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Experimental set-up and Procedure
The testing procedure was identical for both age groups. Eye 
movements were recorded with a corneal reflection eye-
tracker (Tobii 120, Tobii Technology, Danderyd, Sweden) 
recording gaze data at 60 Hz using a 9-point calibration 
procedure. The procedure was repeated if seven or fewer 
calibration points were detected until data for at least eight 
calibration points was acquired.
To control for luminance effects for the pupil dilation 
analyses, the natural lighting was entirely blocked and the 
room lights were on during the calibration and testing. The 
environmental luminance was measured during each testing 
session, which was between 187-195 lux. This was measured 
online using a custom-made device attached to the eye-tracker 
(Atlas Scientific ENV-RGB Color Detector Probe, version 
1.6, combined with Arduino hardware), and the luminance 
values were extracted via Arduino software (version 1.0.5). 
Participants were seated on their parent’s lap. All participants 
viewed the testing material at approximately 60 cm distance.
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Measures
We measured the pupillary responses for each sampling event 
during the first 2000 ms after the sampled ball was visible in 
the container. Pupil data were analyzed using custom-made 
MATLAB scripts (MathWorks, Friedrichsdorf, Germany). 
The data were cleaned via several preprocessing steps. First, 
we screened for missing data points. If pupil dilation values 
were available for both eyes, then these were averaged in order 
to obtain one value per sample. In case of a missing value for 
one of the eyes, only the value from the other eye was used for 
the analyses. If the difference between the left and the right 
eye was larger than 1 (which is considered an indication of 
anisocoria: a condition characterized by unequal pupil sizes) 
or if average values were higher than two standard deviations 
from the mean, the data point was considered unreliable and 
registered as missing. Missing data points due to blinks were 
corrected using a linear interpolation algorithm, in which the 
maximum sample gap was set to 5. Following interpolation, 
the data were smoothed using median and moving average 
filtering in order to reduce the noise in the signal. If there were 
more than 60 missing samples in one trial of 2000 ms, the entire 
trial was excluded from the analyses. Pupil diameter changes 
were obtained by subtracting the average pupil diameter for 
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each sampling trial from a fixed baseline period defined as the 
first 1000 ms from the start of each movie before the puppet 
appeared for the first time. Finally, in case a value for one trial 
deviated more than two standard deviations from the overall 
trial average, it was considered an outlier and removed from 
further analyses. Before computing further statistical analyses 
on the data, we first conducted one sample t-tests against zero 
for each age group to ensure that there were indeed significant 
changes in pupillary responses as compared to the baseline 
level (cf. Gredebäck & Melinder, 2011). These analyses were 
informative as they provided a validation check for further 
statistical analyses testing the effects of task manipulations on 
pupillary responses. 
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Results
Measuring the pupillary responses after each sampled 
outcome separately allowed us to monitor how the children’s 
predictive models evolved over time. One sample t-tests for 
18-month-olds showed that overall, there was no significant 
change in pupillary responses as compared to the baseline 
level (t (34) = 1.11, p = .27). On the other hand, 24-month-
olds showed significant increases in their pupillary responses 
as compared to baseline level (t (50) = 4.18, p < .01). Pupillary 
responses of the 24-month-olds and the 18-month-olds are 
illustrated in Figure 3 and Figure 4, respectively.
Figure 3: Average change in pupil size as compared to a fixed baseline period 
in Minority-first (black line) and Majority-first (gray line) conditions over the 
course of trials in 24-month-olds. Error bars represent SEMs.
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Figure 4: Average change in pupil size as compared to a fixed baseline period 
in Minority-first (black line) and Majority-first (gray line) conditions over the 
course of trials in 18-month-olds. Error bars represent SEMs. 
Because there was no difference in pupil response as 
compared to the baseline level in 18-month-olds, we did not 
compute further analyses for this age group. We reasoned that 
further analyses with this age group would be uninformative 
if not misleading given that there were no changes in 
pupillary responses as compared to the baseline level, which 
nullify interpretations of the changes in pupil dilation as a 
function of different trials and conditions. As we did find a 
significant change in overall pupillary responses as compared 
to the baseline level in 24-month-olds, we focused our further 
analyses on this age group. 
As we predicted differential response patterns for 
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different combinations of trials given the differences in 
sampled outcomes, we examined the first two and last two 
trials separately. To examine participants’ initial responses 
to the probability of the outcomes, we first ran a repeated 
measures ANOVA with condition (Minority-first vs. Majority-
first) as a between-subjects factor and first two trials (1 and 2) 
as a within-subjects factor. This analysis revealed a significant 
trial by condition interaction (F (1, 42) = 4.80, p = .03, η2 = 
0.10). As shown in Figure 3, this interaction was mostly driven 
by the larger difference in pupil dilation between conditions 
in the second trial. Still, follow-up t-tests showed that in the 
first trial, pupillary responses significantly differed between 
the Minority-first condition (M = .22, SD = .20) and the 
Majority-first condition (M = .08, SD = .22), t (46) = 2.15, p 
= .04. Similarly, in the second trial, the difference in pupillary 
responses between the Minority-first condition (M = .25, SD 
= .18) and the Majority-first condition (M = .01, SD = .29) 
was significant, t (40.61) = 3.47, p < .01. These results show 
that in both trials, 24-month-old toddlers’ pupil dilation was 
larger when they observed an improbable sampling action 
as compared to a probable action. This finding supports the 
sub hypothesis of both the second and the third hypothesis: 
toddlers initially expected the samples to represent the 
Chapter 5
175
distribution in the population box, thereby assuming that the 
agent samples from the box randomly. Moreover, as the joint 
probability of sampled outcomes became less probable with 
each sample in the Minority-first condition, the difference 
between the conditions became larger in the second trial. 
When toddlers observed the agent consistently 
performing an improbable action (i.e., selecting minority color 
balls repeatedly), our third hypothesis would assume that this 
led them to revise their predictions: sampling might not be 
random, but biased towards a certain color because of some 
characteristics of the agent (e.g., the agent deliberately selects 
a certain color). After such a revision of the predictive model, 
children would start predicting the agent to pick the minority 
color ball (which was previously considered improbable) 
and now would be surprised to see the majority color ball 
appear. On the other hand, when toddlers observed the agent 
consistently performing a more probable action (i.e., picking 
majority color balls), there would be no reason to revise the 
predictive model. In order to test this assumption, we analyzed 
the differences in pupillary responses right before and after 
observing a change in the agent’s picking behavior. Using a 
repeated measures ANOVA with condition (Minority-first 
and Majority-first) as a between-subjects factor and trials (4 
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and 5) as a within-subjects factor, we analyzed the pupillary 
responses of the 24-month-olds in different conditions on the 
last two trials. As predicted according to the third hypothesis, 
data revealed a significant interaction between condition 
and trials (F (1, 39) = 4.46, p = .04, η2 = 0.09). Follow-up 
t-test analyses showed that in the fourth trial, there was no 
significant difference in pupillary responses between the 
Minority-first condition (M = .16, SD = .20) and the Majority-
first condition (M = .07, SD = .28), t (43) = 1.21, p = .23. 
However, in the fifth trial, pupil dilation in the Minority-first 
condition (M = .27, SD = .16) increased significantly, whereas 
this was not the case for the Majority-first condition (M = .09, 
SD = .22), t (38.65) = 3.01, p < .01. This finding is crucial, 
as it shows that toddlers combined observed outcomes and 
the information about the prior probability of an event with 
unobserved agent characteristics to revise their predictive 
models of the agent’s sampling actions over time. They thus 
showed increased response when this prediction was violated, 
which was assumed in the third hypothesis, but not in the 
other two hypotheses (see Figure 1C and Figure 3). 
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Discussion
In this study, we investigated how 18-month-old infants and 
24-month-old toddlers build predictive models of others’ 
actions. We defined three explanatory variables that one 
might use when predicting the actions of another person: (1) 
previously observed events, (2) the prior probability of certain 
events, and (3) the characteristics of an agent. These three 
variables can be ordered with respect to their complexity. The 
first one only involves simple change detection, the second 
one uses statistical inference and the third one requires 
processing of unobservable agent information. Accordingly, 
we developed three hypotheses each including one relevant 
variable more than the previous, thus building up in their 
level of processing complexity. We tested these hypotheses in 
an experiment in which young children observed a puppet 
picking colored balls one by one from a population box. Their 
pupillary responses were measured after each sampling event 
and were assumed to be an index of prediction errors. 
Our findings showed that 24-month-old toddlers 
integrate the prior probability and current observations as 
well as an agent’s biases to build predictive models of an agent’s 
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sampling actions, and thereby supported the third hypothesis. 
Because we measured the pupillary responses after each 
sampled outcome separately, we were able to monitor how 
these models and the resulting prediction errors evolved over 
time. Toddlers showed significantly larger pupillary responses 
when they observed an improbable as compared to a probable 
sampling action in the first two trials. This finding is in line 
with the assumption that young children form predictions 
based on the available statistical information: they predict 
that the distribution in a sample will reflect the distribution 
in the population from which they are drawn (Xu & Denison, 
2009; Xu & Garcia, 2008) and are thus surprised when this 
prediction is violated.
Moreover, our findings suggest that repeated 
observations of the improbable outcome allowed toddlers 
to revise their predictions. They no longer assumed that the 
agent’s actions were random, but rather that they reflected 
a picking bias. As the agent consistently performed an 
improbable action, they expected the agent to keep showing 
this picking bias. However, when they observed that the 
last pick differed from the previous ones, this prediction 
was violated. The resulting prediction error caused a larger 
increase in their pupillary responses in the last trial in the 
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Minority-first condition, as compared to the Majority-first 
condition. In the Majority-first condition, the overall sample 
resembled the distribution in the population box. Because 
this outcome was highly probable, the fact that the last ball 
had a different color did not lead to a strong increase in the 
pupillary response. These findings show that young children 
combined information about the prior probability of an 
event, observed outcomes and agent characteristics to form 
predictive models of the agent’s sampling actions.
We conclude that 24-month-olds integrate agent 
information into their predictive models. When a sample 
becomes highly improbable given the distribution in the 
population, they no longer assume that the sampling is 
random. Rather, they assume that the sampling is driven by 
specific characteristics of the agent: for some reason, the agent 
deliberately selects one color. For example, this reason could 
be a preference for one color over the other or a task that has 
been given to this agent.
Whereas the 24-month-olds in our study showed clear 
indications of integrating previously observed events, prior 
probability information and the agent characteristics, pupillary 
responses of 18-month-olds were inconclusive. It is likely 
that 18-month-old infants lack the sophisticated generative 
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models that would allow them to perform on this task the 
way the older age group did. For example, in a functional near 
infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) study, Emberson, Richards, 
and Aslin (2015) observed neural responses to violation of 
expectations in 6-month-olds, which suggests that the basic 
neural mechanisms for the generation of predictions are 
already in place early on in life. However, the authors also 
suggest that the internal models on which these predictions 
are based are not as sophisticated as those of adults. Similarly, 
this might explain the differences between 16-month-old 
infants and 24-month-old toddlers in reasoning about the 
subjective nature of preferences in the study by Ma and Xu 
(2011). Overall, predictive models of the environment may 
get more mature over the course of development allowing 
children to predict current input and upcoming events better. 
If we apply this idea to our experiment, the 18-month-
old infants’ models might not be advanced enough to 
integrate all three explanatory variables and the interactions 
between them. Alternatively, even if their internal models 
were advanced, they may not have generated very precise 
predictions resulting in low weighting on the prediction 
errors. For example, based on their internal model, infants 
may have a vague idea that what happened before is likely 
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to happen again (cf. Hypothesis 1), but this idea might have 
been too weak to generate a prediction with high precision. 
Therefore, no or only a very weak prediction error would arise 
if this prediction is violated. Furthermore, it could even be 
the case that their internal models did not incorporate the 
causal link between the agent and the appearance of the balls, 
potentially preventing them from encoding the relevance of 
the color of the balls. Therefore, because of immature internal 
models, infants could have had weaker predictions, incorrect 
predictions or no predictions at all, all of which could explain 
the lack of overlap between their pupil response data and our 
hypotheses.   
Predictive models of the environment might get more 
mature over the course of development, allowing children to 
make precise or detailed predictions about events. In daily 
life, children experience many events and most of the time 
there is a structure in these events. Certain events follow 
each other, which enables them to learn the regularities in 
the environment, and eventually the causal structure behind 
events (Gopnik, 2012). Repeated experiences of certain 
events might allow them to improve their model of the world 
to make more precise or detailed predictions. With many of 
these experiences, a general model of the world develops. 
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As children gather evidence on many different occasions 
involving a variety of agents and objects they choose, they 
collect more and more world knowledge. For example, they 
might see a friend repeatedly picking strawberries rather 
than pears or their father taking coffee rather than tea. All 
these experiences together might allow them to integrate new 
information in their world model efficiently. In other words, 
as their world knowledge improves, they become better at 
inferring the causes of others’ behavior without observing 
many occurrences. As a result, toddlers might need less 
information to form a certain prediction about other agents’ 
choices. Potentially, 24-month-olds have gathered the world 
knowledge necessary to be able to use the three explanatory 
variables in our experiment in the way specified in the third 
hypothesis. These findings shed light upon the mechanisms 
behind toddlers’ inferences about agent-caused events. They 
suggest that from 24 months of age relevant information 
from the environment is used to form predictions about 
the causes of these events. Moreover, these findings show 
that Predictive Processing, which has been suggested to be 
a general framework explaining brain functioning, provides 
promising explanations for the way in which young children 
process another person’s actions.
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Conclusions
We investigated the computational mechanism behind young 
children’s inferences about an agent’s biases. We presented 
formalized hypotheses of how they combine perceptual, 
statistical and agent-related information to form predictive 
models of others’ actions. Our findings support the hypothesis 
that 24-month-old toddlers are able to integrate information 
about individual agents with information about previous 
events and prior probabilities to generate predictive models of 
others’ actions. Moreover, we present an innovative approach 
in which young children’s pupillary responses are used as 
indirect behavioral markers of prediction errors, as described 
in the Predictive Processing framework. The pattern of 
pupillary responses in 24-month-olds, but not 18-month-
olds, showed strong similarities with the prediction error 
patterns formalized by a Predictive Processing model. Our 
findings suggest that Predictive Processing framework 
provides promising explanations of the way in which young 
children process another person’s actions. 
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Appendix
Computational Model
We formalized the three hypotheses described in the 
introduction of this paper in a set of computational models. 
These computational models, based on the causal Bayesian 
network formalization of Predictive Processing as proposed 
in Kwisthout, Bekkering, and van Rooij (2017), compute 
posterior probability distributions that represent the 
expectation or prediction of the infant prior to each ball 
drawn. This prediction is compared to the actually observed 
event, yielding the prediction error. The size of this prediction 
error, quantified as the Kullback-Leibler divergence between 
the observed and predicted probability distributions (Kullback 
& Leibler, 1951), is a qualitative proxy for the pupil dilation. 
The prediction error is instrumental in updating the current 
beliefs that give rise to future predictions. These sub-processes 
in predictive processing (prediction, observation, prediction 
error computation, and belief updating) are graphically 
depicted in the context of the experimental paradigm in 
Figure 5.
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Figure 5: Sub-processes in predictive processing: prediction, observation, 
prediction error computation, and belief updating. Green and yellow bars 
represent probability distributions.
In the Predictive Processing account, the brain 
continuously predicts its inputs using generative models that 
represent the causal structure of the world (Clark, 2013). 
In our computational characterization, these generative 
models take the form of causal Bayesian networks (Pearl, 
2000) with hypothesis nodes (representing the potential 
causes of the phenomena observed), prediction nodes 
(representing the observable information), and intermediate 
nodes (representing contextual information). The attributed 
preference of the agent is represented as a hypothesis 
node, the predicted outcome of the draw is represented as 
a prediction node, and the container distribution and the 
previous draws are represented as intermediate nodes. In the 
model representing Hypothesis 1, the container distribution 
and the preference of the agent is absent, and predictions are 
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solely made based on the previous balls drawn. In the model 
representing Hypothesis 2, the container distribution is 
included, but the preference of the agent is still absent. In the 
model representing Hypothesis 3, finally, all three aspects are 
included. Figure 6 graphically depicts the structure of these 
three models prior to drawing one of the balls.
A                  B                 C
Figure 6: In the left panel, the model for H1 is depicted. Preceding every ball 
that is drawn from the box, the prediction (represented by the prediction 
variable Pred) is based on the previous ball (intermediate variable Prev) only; 
a uniform distribution is assumed for the first ball. There are no hypotheses 
regarding picking bias; also, the content of the container is not modeled, as 
it is ignored in H1. The model for H2 is depicted in the middle panel. Here, in 
addition to the information regarding the previous ball, the contents of the 
container form a contextual influence that modulates the prediction; here 
modeled as an additional intermediate variable, that is, Box distribution. In the 
right panel, the model for H3 is depicted, in which in addition to the available 
contextual information also the attributed agent preference is included. As this 
preference is a causal explanation for the ball drawn – rather than a contextual 
influence –, which can be updated in the light of prediction errors, we model 
this variable as a hypothesis variable Hyp.
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With respect to the conditional probability distributions, 
we assume that the Box distribution variable represents the 
statistics of the container, that is, P (majority color) = 0.8 and 
P (minority color) = 0.2. We ignore the (relatively minimal) 
changes in the container over time and keep these prior 
probabilities constant. In the model corresponding with H1, 
we define P (Pred = C | Prev = C) = 0.8 for both the minority 
and majority color C; with P (Pred = minority color) = P 
(Pred = majority color) = 0.5 before any ball is drawn. In 
H2, we condition on the Box distribution variable as well 
and have P (Pred = C | Prev = C, Box = C) = 0.8, P (Pred = 
C | Prev = C, box = -C) = 0.2, and P (Pred = C | Box = C) 
= 1; here, -C denotes the opposite color, that is, if C is the 
minority color, ¬C is the majority color and vice versa. Note 
that in our model the previous color is always observed and 
that P (Pred = -C) = 1 – P (Pred = C), i.e., this fully defines 
the conditional probability distribution. In H3, this model 
still holds for the majority case, but we also condition on the 
attributed preference as well. We define P (Pred | Prevt = P, 
Box = B, Hyp = H), where Prevt [with t = 1...4] denotes the 
t-th ball drawn, as follows:
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Again note that P (Pred = ¬C) = 1 – P(Pred = C) such 
that this table fully describes the probability distribution for 
the situation where C1 = C2 = C3 = C4 is the minority color. 
Given these computational models, we can compute the 
prediction error for each condition (Minority-first/Majority-
first) and for each of the three hypotheses before every ball 
drawn. These prediction errors are depicted in Figure 1 in the 
introduction.
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C
C
C
C
Box
C
C
-C
-C
Hyp
C
-C
C
-C
P(P | B,H)
1
1
1
1
P(P | C1,B,H)
1
1
1
1
P(P | C2,B,H)
1
0.1
1
0.1
P(P | C3,B,H) 
1
0.05
1
0.05
P(P | C4,B,H)
1
0.01
1
0.01
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Learning allows individuals to construct and modulate an 
internal model of the world for efficient functioning (Friston, 
2010; Picard & Friston, 2014). This thesis consists of four 
experiments that investigated how infants, young children, and 
adults update their internal models in a dynamic environment 
and how they revise the structure of their internals models, 
if their current models no longer explain their observations 
accurately. In this chapter, I recap the main findings of the 
four experiments, and discuss how they contribute to our 
understanding of model updating and model revision across 
development.
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Summary of the findings
This thesis presents four empirical studies in which 
participants were expected to generate a model of the 
experimental environment. In all studies, I used paradigms in 
which the experimental environment suddenly changed. The 
underlying assumption in all experiments was that learners 
who have built a model would adjust their internal models 
when confronted with unexpected changes to maintain an 
accurate representation of the experimental structure. 
In the study described in Chapter 2, I investigated 
whether infants and adults adjust their internal models to 
represent the statistics of a dynamic environment. In a saccadic 
planning paradigm, participants observed differently colored 
bees that appeared at one of eight designated spots on a circle. 
In “update trials”, the bees appeared at a new location and 
continued to appear at this location for on average four trials. 
In “no-update trials”, the bees were shown at a new location 
on the circle for once. After this trial, the bees continued to 
appear at the same location as before. The colors of the bees 
cued whether the following bees would continue to appear 
at the new location or at the same location as previously. 
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Although the sudden appearances of the targets at new 
locations were unexpected in both trial types, participants 
were expected to update their models in the “update trials”, but 
not in “no-update trials”, as the targets continued to appear at 
this new location only after the “update trials”. Data revealed 
that 14-month-old infants generated distinct predictive 
models of the dynamic experimental environment. When 
the parameters of the environment suddenly changed, infants 
updated their internal models only in “update trials”, but not 
in “no-update trials”. Interestingly, adults did not differentiate 
between the different types of unexpected information 
and used a single model to guide their actions, if they were 
not explicitly instructed to do otherwise. Adults showed a 
response pattern closer to that of infants, when instructed.
In the study presented in Chapter 3, I examined whether 
and how 9-month-old infants form predictions based on the 
repeated observations of a sequence of images. Using an 
audio-visual EEG paradigm, I examined the neural activity 
in the brain in response to the violation of formed predictions 
when the sequence was unexpectedly interrupted. In addition, 
I investigated whether infants dissociate between different 
types of unexpected events in the extent to which they are 
relevant to updating their internal models. Infants observed 
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a continuous sequence of stimuli in which the same images 
were repeated for several trials. “Update” and “no-update” 
cues were interspersed among the expected trials, which 
differed in terms of whether or not they signaled a future 
change in the sequence. The predicted pattern was changed 
after the “update” cue, whereas the pattern remained the same 
following the “no-update” cue. Results demonstrated that 
9-month-old infants formed models based on the repeated 
observations of a predictable sequence of images. Infants 
showed an increased neural response indicating a violation 
of their predictions when the sequence was unexpectedly 
interrupted by the sudden appearances of the cues. Further 
analyses revealed that participants associated unexpected cues 
with future changes in the sequence and adjusted their models 
after they observed a change. In other words, each time they 
viewed an image that interrupted the sequence, they expected 
the following images to be different from the previous trials. 
Interestingly, when an expected change was absent, infants 
also showed an increased neural response suggesting a top-
down modulation of sensory processing, as suggested by the 
Predictive Processing account of brain functioning.
In the experiment described in Chapter 4, I examined 
how young children and adults revise their models of 
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others’ actions. More specifically, I investigated the relative 
contribution of frequency and efficiency principles in 
governing individuals’ predictions about an agent’s actions. 
Moreover, I examined the developmental change in the 
relative weight of the efficiency and frequency principles 
in the participants’ predictions. During a learning phase, 
children aged 14, 25, and 36 months and adults repeatedly 
observed an agent taking a long path when a shorter path was 
impassable. In the test phase, when both paths were available, 
the agent continuously took the short (i.e. the most efficient) 
path. Based on repeated observations of an agent taking a 
long path when a shorter path was impassable, participants 
formed a model about the agent’s action in accordance with 
a frequency principle and expected the agent to act the 
same way throughout the experiment. When the agent then 
repeatedly took the short path, while both paths were passable, 
only older age groups revised their models to accommodate 
efficiency attributions, whereas the younger age groups did 
not show any signs of model revision but kept expecting the 
agent to act as previously. 
In the study presented in Chapter 5, I investigated how 
young children revise their internal models of an agent’s 
sampling actions over time and whether a computational 
Chapter 6
197
model based on the causal Bayesian network formalization 
of Predictive Processing can explain this process. In 
particular, I presented three formalized hypotheses on 
how young children generate predictive models of others’ 
sampling actions by integrating information about current 
observations, prior probabilities and agents’ biases and how 
they revise their models if the initial models no longer explain 
their observations. I measured pupillary responses of children 
as a behavioral marker of prediction errors, as described in 
the Predictive Processing framework. Participants observed 
an agent drawing balls from a population box that contained 
balls of two colors with a ratio of 1:4, and placing them in 
a container. In the “Minority-first” condition, the agent first 
performed a series of improbable actions by picking four 
colored balls of the minority color, before picking a ball in 
the majority color. In the “Majority-first” condition, the agent 
first performed a series of more probable actions by drawing 
four balls of the majority color, which was followed by one 
minority color ball. After each draw, I measured the changes in 
children’s pupillary responses. I then compared the qualitative 
pattern of pupillary responses to prediction error patterns as 
generated by the computational models. Data revealed that 
the 24-month-old children in my study generated predictive 
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models of others’ sampling actions by integrating information 
about current observations, prior probabilities and agents. 
Although the young children initially expected the sampled 
outcome to represent the ratio of the population box, they 
revised their models as they observed the agent consistently 
performing the improbable action. That is, the repeated 
observations of the improbable outcome allowed young 
children to switch to a new model assuming that sampling 
might not be random, but biased towards a certain color. 
Using a computational model based on the causal Bayesian 
network formalization of Predictive Processing, I proposed 
an explanation on the computational mechanism behind this 
model revision process. 
In summary, this thesis consists of four studies in which 
I showed that infants, young children, and adults updated 
their existing internal models in response to changes in the 
environment. More specifically, they continuously adjusted 
their internal models in order to maintain the accuracy of the 
models in a dynamic environment, as new observations were 
made. Furthermore, I demonstrated that participants revised 
their internal models when their current world models 
were inadequate to explain their observations. In this case, 
different from model updating, they changed the structure 
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of their models, for example, by adding new variables to the 
models. In the following sections, I will discuss the findings in 
the light of the Bayesian framework and further explain how 
these results contribute to the current state of knowledge in 
the field.
Bayesian learning in 
development
Bayesian principles have guided researchers to study human 
learning. As many argue that learning in adults works according 
to Bayes’ rule (Knill & Pouget, 2004; Körding & Wolpert, 
2004;  O’Reilly et al., 2013), one might wonder whether 
also infant learning works in a Bayesian fashion. Although 
the Bayesian framework provides an explanation of how 
children modify their existing knowledge as new evidence is 
acquired, it is far from settled that infants’ behavior and brain 
function are optimized according to Bayes’ rule. This thesis 
uses the Bayesian framework as a conceptual perspective 
to understand learning in infants and young children. In 
other words, Bayesian framework has been helpful to guide 
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the research questions and interpret the findings of the 
studies described in the thesis. However, it should be noted 
that no claim is made on the Bayes optimality of children’s 
behavior or brain function. Except for the study described in 
Chapter 5, no algorithmic description is used. Moreover, any 
description at an implementation level (Marr, 2010) is beyond 
the scope of this thesis. In the following section, basing my 
arguments on Bayesian principles, I will discuss how infants 
and young children update their models of the parameters of 
the environment in response to changes and how they revise 
the structure of their models when these models are no longer 
representative of the outside world.
Model updating
One of the questions I addressed in this thesis is whether 
and how infants and young children adjust their models of 
a dynamic environment when confronted with unexpected 
changes. In the study described in Chapter 2, infants and adults 
were presented with a sequence of trials that mostly followed 
a predictable pattern. From time to time, the parameters of 
the environment changed urging for an update of the internal 
models. In order to perform successfully, participants were 
required to exploit stable features of the task as well as to 
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adjust their models to the changes. 
Bayes’ rule explains how learning occurs when events 
are observed one after the other, such as in the experimental 
paradigms used in the studies in Chapter 2 and 3. That is, 
as new observations are made, priors are updated to a new 
posterior that are then used as priors for the next observation. 
Here, the sequential aspect is particularly helpful as it allows 
learners to generate an environmental model while they still 
acquire new information (O’Reilly, Jbabdi, & Behrens, 2012). 
In other words, based on the sequential data, participants 
infer the statistics of the experimental environment after a 
number of trials, without having the need to observe all trials 
in the experiment to learn the parameters of the experimental 
environment (O’Reilly & Mars, 2015).
 In the experiments described in Chapter 2 and 3, 
observations of a sequence of events allowed the participants 
to generate a model of the experimental structure. Based 
on their models, participants formed predictions about the 
upcoming stimuli and guided their actions accordingly, as 
observed in saccadic eye movements of 14-month-old infants 
and adults in the experiment described in Chapter 2. In this 
specific case, participants learned the predictive value of the 
different color cues and updated their models only in “update 
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trials” but not in “no-update trials”, which allowed them to 
initiate saccadic responses to the correct target locations 
to follow the sequence. Relatedly, in the study presented in 
Chapter 3, when the continuity of the sequence was broken, 
infants showed an increased neural response suggesting a 
violation of predictions about the upcoming stimuli in the 
sequence. 
Although learners make use of previous observations to 
build a model of the environment to predict future events, no 
new learning occurs if the environment is stable or changes 
in a predictable way. Here, it should be noted that unexpected 
changes do not always lead to updating of internal models, 
and updating can occur without surprise. For example, one 
can adapt one’s internal models of social norms when moving 
to a different culture, if one already anticipates differences 
between the cultures. However, in some cases, unexpected 
events signaling change require observers to update their 
internal models of the environment. In other words, 
unexpected changes, which occur with low probability under 
one’s current model, provide learners with opportunities to 
acquire new knowledge in order to maintain an accurate 
representation of the structure of the environment (O’Reilly 
et al., 2013). 
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Previous research has suggested that the more uncertain 
observers are about the environmental properties, the more 
willing they would be to update the models (Courville, Daw, 
& Touretsky, 2006; O’Reilly, 2013). As shown in the study in 
Chapter 2, although infants and adults who were not instructed 
were provided with same prior information about the task, 
14-month-old infants dissociated between unexpected events 
in the extent to which they were relevant to updating their 
internal models; however, uninstructed adults did not. From a 
developmental perspective, I argue that infants are more open 
to accommodate new information and adjust their internal 
models flexibly because of increased uncertainty about the 
environmental properties, whereas adults have a tendency 
to exploit established strategies when faced with uncertain 
situations.
In summary, I show that observations of a sequence of 
events allow the learners to form a model of the environment. 
As the environment changes, learners update their models to 
represent the statistics of the experimental structure accurately. 
My research addressed an interesting developmental gap in 
the updating of internal models between adults and infants. 
Whereas infants differentiated between unexpected events 
for updating, when not instructed, adults had a tendency 
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to update their internal models when confronted with 
unexpected changes.  In the following section, I will discuss 
how young learners go beyond model updating and revise the 
structure of their models if updating their models fall short to 
explain their observations. 
Model revision
Another question I addressed in this thesis is how young 
children revise existing models, if these models no longer 
account for the observed data. This question was examined 
with the experiments described in Chapter 4 and 5, in which 
participants were expected to substantially revise their 
models by adding new variables, as simply updating their 
beliefs about the parameters of the environment would not 
have been adequate to explain their observations. 
When and how do children revise their models? Within 
the Bayesian framework, it has been argued that cognitive 
development is the result of model selection (Perfors et al., 
2011). Learners face the task to find a trade-off between 
parsimony of the models (i.e. explaining the observations 
with as few variables as possible) and their goodness-of-fit. 
The learner compares how well models with different levels of 
complexity account for their observations, given the available 
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evidence. For example, if a parsimonious model accounts for 
the observation, the learner would select this model over a 
more complex one to account for the data. However, if the 
parsimonious model poorly explains the data, this initial 
model should be revised (e.g. adding more variables to the 
model or adding values to the variables) to make it a better 
fit. In this case, the more complex models, potentially having 
more explanatory power, will be favored to account for the 
observation, as data accumulates3 (Gopnik & Bonawitz, 2015). 
Perfors and colleagues (2011) suggested that cognitive 
development could be explained by the adaptation of the 
models to the data, with different models embraced by the 
young learner at different stages of development. In this 
view, the accumulated observations are the driving factors 
that allow for model revision. Here, one key advantage of 
the Bayesian models in accounting for model revision is its 
transparency in explaining how a preference for a simpler 
model changes as the learner acquires more evidence. Similar 
to scientific practice, it has been argued that children use a 
form of Ockham’s Razor (i.e. no complexity beyond necessity) 
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to modulate the trade-off between simplicity and goodness-
of fit of the models. This argument suggests that the most 
parsimonious models will initially be considered to explain 
the observations. As more observations are made, the more 
complex models, representing lower simplicity but a better fit, 
will likely be favored to explain the data due to having more 
explanatory power.  In other words, as data accumulate, the 
complex model will become more likely than the simple one, 
which is then favored to account for the observations (Gopnik 
& Bonawitz, 2015).
This argument is supported by many findings in 
the developmental literature. For example, Bonawitz 
and Lombrozo (2012) have shown that children choose 
explanations with fewer variables when faced with two 
competing explanations that are equally probable. Moreover, 
Goodman and colleagues (2006) showed that children’s false 
belief understanding could be described as a transition from 
simpler to more complex models: based on unexpected 
evidence, children switch from predictions consistent with 
simpler models including fewer variables to those in line with 
more complex ones with more variables. In the experiment 
in Chapter 4, data revealed that, in the first test trial, after a 
change in the environment was introduced (i.e. both paths 
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being passable), participants used a simple model based on 
a frequency principle to make predictions. However, upon 
observing the agent repeatedly taking the short path, only 
the older age groups readily revised this model to integrate 
an efficiency attribution. In other words, whereas initially, all 
age groups used the most parsimonious model to explain the 
data, when this model fell short to account for the current 
observation, only older age groups switched to a more 
complex model incorporating efficiency assumptions. 
In chapter 5, I introduced a formalized explanation of 
model revision in young children. Using a computational 
model based on the causal Bayesian network formalization 
of Predictive Processing, I investigated the computational 
mechanism behind young children’s inferences about an 
agent’s bias. I presented three formalized hypotheses of how 
children combine perceptual, statistical, and agent-related 
information to form predictive models of others’ actions. 
These three explanatory variables were ordered with respect 
to their complexity. The first one only involved simple 
change detection, the second one used statistical inference 
and the third one required processing of unobservable agent 
information. Accordingly, three models were developed each 
including one relevant variable more than the previous and 
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thus building up in their level of complexity. 
Findings showed that 24-month-olds had a moderately 
complex model based on statistical inference in the beginning 
of the experiment. They predicted that the distribution in a 
sample would reflect the distribution in the population from 
which it is drawn assuming that the picking was random. 
However, as the agent consistently performed an improbable 
action, they revised their models. Because their current 
observations did not confirm a model based on statistical 
inference, children favored a more complex model to explain 
their observations in which hidden causes such as a picking 
bias of the agent was taken into account. Here, it is important 
to note that, in Chapter 5, I used Bayesian approach as a 
computational and algorithmic benchmark. Although a 
Bayesian model is helpful to understand the computational 
mechanism underlying infants’ performances, it is useful to 
ensure that the data are better fit to a Bayesian than to any 
alternative models. Future research could directly compare 
different modeling architectures to provide further evidence 
on this matter. 
To summarize, I demonstrate that although children 
initially use more parsimonious models to explain their 
observations, as data accumulates, they switch to models that 
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are more complex, if a parsimonious model poorly accounts 
for their observations. However, data revealed that this 
pattern is only observed in older children and adults. These 
developmental differences might be explained by the changes 
in the model repertoire. Over the course of development, 
children gather evidence on many different occasions 
involving a variety of agents and objects, which allows them 
to gain world knowledge. As their world knowledge improves, 
the number and the complexity of the models increase (Piaget 
& Cook, 1952). This allows learners to readily switch to models 
that are more complex, if simpler models are inadequate to 
explain their observations. Although the current studies 
show developmental differences in the revision of the models, 
it remains an open question how exactly developmental 
and individual differences in evaluating the parsimony and 
goodness-of fit of the models contribute to model selection. 
For example, an interesting avenue for future research would 
be to investigate how much non-fit is needed before a more 
complex model replaces a more parsimonious one and how 
exactly maturation and experience modulate this process.
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Predictive Processing in 
development
In almost all studies in this thesis, data revealed that children 
formed generative models that are either updated or revised 
in the face of new observations. Except for the study described 
in Chapter 3, in which I measured the electrophysiological 
activity in the infant brain, I focused on behavioral measures 
to answer these questions. In Chapter 2 and 3, I showed 
that infants and adults build predictive internal models that 
represent the statistics of a dynamic environment. In Chapter 
5, I measured pupillary responses as a behavioral marker of 
prediction errors, as described in the Predictive Processing 
framework. Yet providing initial evidence on predictive 
internal models in early childhood, there is definitely a lot 
more to be done to understand whether an infant brain 
works according to the assumptions made by the Predictive 
Processing framework. 
Building on Bayesian principles, the Predictive 
Processing framework has been helpful to interpret the 
behavioral findings I obtained from infants and adults. 
In Chapter 3, I present a study in which I measured the 
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electrophysiological activity in the infant brain to investigate 
the neural markers of predictive processing in young infants. 
More specifically, I examined how 9-month-old infants 
update their internal models and which neural markers are 
indicative of this process. I showed that both early and late 
sensory responses were modulated by predictions generated 
by the infants’ internal models. When infants observed a 
sudden interruption in the predicted sequence of events, they 
showed a prominent negative central response. Interestingly, 
infants also showed a neural response locked to the absence of 
a predicted change in the environment. Because infants might 
have generated a model that unexpected events signal a change 
in the sequence of events, the omission of a change resulted 
in differential neural activity. This finding is particularly 
interesting as it corroborates recent findings showing that top-
down predictions modulate sensory processing in infancy, as 
described in the Predictive Processing framework (Emberson, 
Richards, & Aslin, 2015; Kouider et al., 2015).
Although initial evidence seems to be pointing at the 
predictive architecture of the human brain being present 
from early in development, there are still open issues when 
considering whether Predictive Processing is a promising 
framework to explain behavior and brain function in early 
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development. Does an infant brain work according to the 
Bayesian principles? Is it a “prediction machine”, meaning 
that it constantly generates predictions? Is infant brain 
functioning hierarchically organized? Does the infant brain 
work according to the free energy principle? And what are the 
neural markers of feedback and feedforward connections in an 
infant brain? Comprehensive approaches using computational 
modeling and cutting-edge developmental research methods 
are needed to shed light into the development of generative 
models during infancy, which is currently underspecified in 
the framework.
In addition to the big questions as outlined above, there 
are also several conceptual issues that could be addressed 
when tailoring the framework to infant development. For 
example, although mathematically minimizing free energy is 
equivalent to maximizing the accuracy of the models (Friston, 
Fitzgerald, Rigoli, Schwartenbeck, & Pezzulo, 2016), the latter 
might be a more suitable conceptualization of infant behavior. 
Observing natural motor development would clarify this 
argument. Infants around 12 to 19 months take 2367.6 steps 
and fall 17.4 times per hour (Adolph et al., 2012). One would 
wonder why infants would repeatedly try to take steps, as each 
try would presumably elicit prediction errors, perhaps, until 
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they master the skill. However, if the behavior were driven by 
the goal of maximizing the accuracy of the internal models, this 
would potentially better explain what drives infants’ behavior, 
among others curiosity and exploration, which are known to 
be crucial to infant learning and development (Oudeyer & 
Smith, 2016). With this thesis, I set the stage for future studies 
to investigate Predictive Processing in development.
Future directions
From the series of experiments described here, many new 
questions open up for every answer. For example, although 
algorithms based on Bayes’ rule seem to explain adult 
brain functioning (Knill & Pouget, 2004; O’Reilly et al., 
2013), it is still an empirical question whether the infant 
brain works according to Bayesian principles. A focused 
investigation on whether an infant brain is Bayes optimal 
would enrich our understanding of the building blocks of 
human brain functioning. Relatedly, providing empirical and 
computational evidence on whether the Predictive Processing 
framework could explain infant learning and cognitive 
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development would pave the way to a novel research topic. 
What are the computational mechanisms that explain how 
infants generate predictive models that would allow them to 
make predictions? How do infants use prediction errors to 
form predictive internal models? How big the prediction error 
needs to be before a revision of the model is initiated? Not 
only would such research inform developmental scientists to 
understand infant behavior and brain functioning, but also 
it will enrich the Predictive Processing framework to explain 
how generative internal models are developed. Therefore, 
interdisciplinary research that combines computational, 
experimental and even developmental robotics approaches 
would be useful to provide comprehensive answers to the 
questions raised above.
Future research could also benefit from computational 
approaches that map out developmental progress to explain 
how generative internal models are built and revised over the 
course of development. For example, in the studies described 
in Chapter 2 and 3, data revealed that whereas 14-month-old 
infants dissociated between different forms of unexpected 
events in the extent to which they modulate their predictive 
models, 9-month-olds and uninstructed adults did not. 
To begin with, it would be interesting to examine whether 
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the development of generative models might thus follow a 
u-shaped pattern. Modeling how generative internal models 
change from childhood to adulthood would provide further 
insights in the mechanisms that allow for learning across 
different ages.
Although, in this thesis, I examined internal models as 
an intrapersonal process, in real life, infants build and revise 
their world models in interaction with social partners such 
as their parents, siblings or peers. In the future, it would 
be interesting to explore how infants’ world models are 
generated and revised online during interactions with a social 
partner. It would also be an ecologically valid approach, given 
that a social partner is one of the main information sources 
in a young infant’s life. Computational work to explain the 
mechanisms behind this process would extend our knowledge 
on how young children generate and revise their models 
during interactions with others.
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Societal relevance
Understanding how young children build a model of their 
environment and how they revise these models in response 
to environmental changes would inform many different 
fields besides experimental and computational work. To 
begin with, providing a comprehensive explanation of young 
children’s learning would be useful in designing educational 
policies. For example, understanding the current model 
that children have about a certain task, and consequently 
improving the comprehension of that given task could be 
one way of using the insights gained from the current work. 
Thus, understanding how children learn would potentially 
be informative in planning tailored approaches in home and 
kindergarten settings to enhance learning outcomes. 
Another field in which the findings of the current work 
would be useful is digital technologies. In the past years, there 
has been an explosion of digital technology tools that target 
young populations. For example, Shuler (2012) reports that 
more than 80% of the bestseller applications in the education 
category of the iTunes store address early learners. Although 
digital technologies became an inevitable part of our lives, 
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experimental research that feed the development of new 
digital technology tools for early learners is almost non-
existent. Research addressing the underlying mechanisms 
and strategies young children use during learning would 
have extreme benefits on the development of new digital 
technology tools for early learners, given that users are 
exposed to the uncontrolled growth of digital tools that lack 
scientific basis and specificity. For example, understanding 
the circumstances under which the learners’ disregard their 
currents models in favor of a new model would help to adjust 
the complexity of the information provided using the digital 
tools to maximize learning.
Finally yet importantly, research on the formation 
and adjustment of adaptive world models would inform our 
understanding of how maladaptive models are formed and 
how they could be changed. What are the differences in their 
world models between a child with a conduct disorder and 
a typically developing one? What makes some individuals 
resilient to the uncertainty embedded in environmental 
changes whereas some have difficulties to adapt to changes? 
Understanding the nature of individual models would not 
only inform clinical research but also psychotherapy practices 
and other intervention methods aiming to define and change 
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the thought and behavior patterns that are working against 
the individual. 
Conclusions
In this thesis, I examined learning processes in young 
children by addressing whether and how children of different 
ages update their models of a dynamic environment and 
revise their world models, if the models no longer explain 
the outside world accurately. Using eye tracking, EEG and 
computational modeling, I provided an in-depth approach to 
investigating learning in infants, young children and adults. 
The findings of four experiments described in this thesis were 
interpreted in the light of the Bayesian framework. I show 
that (1) learners adjust their internal models to represent the 
statistics of a dynamic environment; (2) whereas they initially 
use the most parsimonious models, as data accumulates, 
experienced learners switch to more complex models, if the 
initial model is not adequate to explain their observations. 
Moreover, a contemporary approach to the Bayesian brain 
hypothesis, such as Predictive Processing, provides a 
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promising explanation of the way in which young children 
make sense of the outside world. The studies described in 
this thesis pave the way to innovative and interesting future 
research in the years to come. 
General Discussion
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In dit proefschrift worden vier empirische studies 
gepresenteerd waarin deelnemers een model van de 
experimentele omgeving moesten genereren. In alle studies 
gebruikte ik paradigma’s waarin de experimentele omgeving 
plotseling veranderde. De onderliggende aanname bij alle 
experimenten was dat lerenden die een model hebben 
opgebouwd, hun interne modellen bij onverwachte 
veranderingen zouden aanpassen om een nauwkeurige 
weergave van de experimentele structuur te behouden. 
In de in hoofdstuk 2 beschreven studie heb ik onderzocht 
of zuigelingen en volwassenen hun interne modellen aanpassen 
om de statistieken van een dynamische omgeving weer te 
geven. In een saccadisch planningsparadigma observeerden 
de deelnemers verschillend gekleurde bijen die op één van de 
acht aangewezen plekken in een cirkel verschenen. In “update 
trials” verschenen de bijen op een nieuwe locatie en bleven ze 
op deze locatie verschijnen voor gemiddeld vier trials. In “no-
update trials” werden de bijen één keer op een nieuwe plaats 
op de cirkel getoond. Na deze trial bleven de bijen op dezelfde 
plaats verschijnen als voorheen. De kleuren van de bijen gaven 
aan of de volgende bijen zouden blijven verschijnen op de 
nieuwe locatie of op dezelfde plaats als voorheen. Hoewel de 
plotselinge verschijningen van de bijen op nieuwe locaties in 
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beide trialtypen onverwacht waren, werd van de deelnemers 
verwacht dat ze hun modellen zouden actualiseren in de 
“update trials”, maar niet in “no-update trials”, aangezien de 
bijen alleen in de “update trials” op deze nieuwe locatie bleven 
verschijnen. De uitkomsten toonden aan dat 14 maanden 
oude zuigelingen duidelijke voorspellende modellen van de 
dynamische experimentele omgeving genereerden. Wanneer 
de parameters van de omgeving plotseling veranderden, pasten 
baby’s hun interne modellen alleen aan in “update trials”, 
maar niet in “no-update trials”. Opvallend is dat volwassenen 
geen onderscheid maakten tussen de verschillende soorten 
onverwachte informatie en één model gebruikten om hun 
acties te sturen, als ze niet expliciet werden geïnstrueerd om 
iets anders te doen. Als ze wel instructies kregen, vertoonden 
volwassenen een reactiepatroon dat dichter bij dat van 
zuigelingen lag.
In de studie in hoofdstuk 3 onderzocht ik of en hoe 
negen maanden oude zuigelingen voorspellingen vormen 
op basis van herhaalde waarnemingen van een reeks 
beelden. Met behulp van een audio-visueel EEG paradigma, 
onderzocht ik de neurale activiteit in de hersenen als reactie 
op de schending van gevormde voorspellingen wanneer 
de sequentie onverwacht werd onderbroken. Daarnaast 
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heb ik onderzocht of baby’s een onderscheid maken tussen 
verschillende soorten onverwachte gebeurtenissen in de 
mate waarin ze relevant zijn voor het actualiseren van 
hun interne modellen. De zuigelingen observeerden een 
ononderbroken opeenvolging van stimuli waarin dezelfde 
beelden voor verscheidene trials werden herhaald. “Update” 
en “no-update” worden afgewisseld met de verwachte trials, 
die verschillen wat betreft het al dan niet aangeven van een 
toekomstige verandering in de sequentie. Het voorspelde 
patroon werd gewijzigd na de “update”-cue, terwijl het 
patroon hetzelfde bleef na de “no-update”-cue. De resultaten 
toonden aan dat zuigelingen van 9 maanden oud modellen 
vormden gebaseerd op de herhaalde waarnemingen van 
een voorspelbare opeenvolging van beelden. De zuigelingen 
toonden een verhoogde neurale reactie die op een schending 
van hun voorspellingen wijst wanneer de opeenvolging 
onverwacht door de plotselinge verschijning van de signalen 
werd onderbroken. Verdere analyses brachten aan het 
licht dat deelnemers onverwachte signalen bij toekomstige 
veranderingen in de sequentie betrokken en hun modellen 
aanpasten nadat ze een verandering hadden waargenomen. 
Met andere woorden, telkens als ze een beeld bekeken dat 
de sequentie onderbrak, verwachtten ze dat de volgende 
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beelden anders zouden zijn dan de vorige trials. Interessant 
was dat wanneer een verwachte verandering afwezig was, 
de zuigelingen ook een verhoogde neurale reactie toonden 
die een top-down modulatie van zintuiglijke verwerking 
voorstelt, zoals gesuggereerd door het Predictive Processing 
account over het functioneren van de hersenen.
In het in hoofdstuk 4 beschreven experiment heb 
ik onderzocht hoe jonge kinderen en volwassenen hun 
modellen van acties van anderen herzien. Meer in het 
bijzonder onderzocht ik de relatieve bijdrage van frequentie- 
en efficiëntieprincipes aan de voorspellingen van individuen 
over het handelen van een agent. Bovendien onderzocht ik 
de ontwikkelingsverandering in het relatieve gewicht van de 
efficiëntie- en frequentieprincipes in de voorspellingen van de 
deelnemers. Tijdens een leerfase zagen kinderen van 14, 25 en 
36 maanden en volwassenen herhaaldelijk een agent die een 
lange weg nam toen een kortere weg onbegaanbaar was. In de 
testfase, toen beide paden beschikbaar waren, nam de agent 
continu het korte (d.w.z. meest efficiënte) pad. Gebaseerd op 
herhaalde waarnemingen van een agent die een lange weg 
inslaat wanneer een kortere weg onbegaanbaar was, vormden 
de deelnemers een model over de actie van de agent in 
overeenstemming met een frequentieprincipe en verwachtten 
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dat de agent tijdens het experiment op dezelfde manier zou 
handelen. Toen de agent vervolgens herhaaldelijk de korte 
weg nam, terwijl beide paden begaanbaar waren, herzagen 
alleen oudere proefpersonen hun modellen om hierin de 
efficiëntie mee te nemen, terwijl de jongere leeftijdsgroepen 
geen tekenen van modelherziening lieten zien, maar bleven 
verwachten dat de agent zou handelen zoals voorheen. 
In de studie beschreven in hoofdstuk 5 onderzocht ik hoe 
jonge kinderen hun interne modellen van de steekproefacties 
van een agent in de loop der tijd herzien en of een rekenmodel 
gebaseerd op het causale Bayesiaanse netwerk van Predictive 
Processing dit proces kan verklaren. In het bijzonder heb ik 
drie geformaliseerde hypothesen gepresenteerd over hoe 
jonge kinderen voorspellende modellen genereren voor de 
steekproefacties van anderen door informatie over huidige 
waarnemingen, eerdere waarschijnlijkheden en voorkeuren 
van de agent te integreren en hoe zij hun modellen herzien als 
de oorspronkelijke modellen niet langer hun waarnemingen 
verklaren. Ik heb pupilreacties van kinderen gemeten als een 
gedragsmarkering van voorspellingsfouten, zoals beschreven 
in het Predictive Processing framework. De deelnemers 
observeerden een agent die ballen trok uit een ballenbak die 
ballen van twee kleuren met een verhouding van 1:4 bevatten, 
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en het plaatsen daarvan in een bakje. In de “Minority-first” 
conditie, voerde de agent eerst een reeks van onwaarschijnlijke 
acties uit door het trekken van vier gekleurde ballen van 
de minderheidskleur, voor het trekken van een bal in de 
meerderheidskleur. In de “Majority-first” conditie, voerde de 
agent eerst een reeks meer waarschijnlijke acties uit door vier 
ballen van de meerderheidskleur te trekken, die werd gevolgd 
door een bal van de minderheidskleur. Na elke trekking 
heb ik de veranderingen in de pupilreacties van kinderen 
gemeten. Vervolgens vergeleek ik het kwalitatieve patroon van 
pupilreacties op voorspellingsfoutpatronen zoals gegenereerd 
door rekenmodellen. De uitkomsten toonden aan dat de 
24 maanden oude kinderen in mijn studie voorspellende 
modellen genereerden van de steekproefacties van anderen 
door informatie over huidige waarnemingen, eerdere 
kansen en agenten te integreren. Hoewel de jonge kinderen 
aanvankelijk verwachtten dat het resultaat van de steekproef de 
verhouding van de ballenbak zou weergeven, hebben zij hun 
modellen herzien omdat zij de agent die de onwaarschijnlijke 
actie consequent uitvoerde, waarnamen. Dat wil zeggen, de 
herhaalde waarnemingen van het onwaarschijnlijke resultaat 
stelden jonge kinderen in staat om over te schakelen op 
een nieuw model, dat ervan uitgaat dat de steekproef niet 
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willekeurig zou kunnen zijn, maar vooringenomen naar een 
bepaalde kleur. Met behulp van een rekenmodel gebaseerd 
op de causale Bayesiaanse netwerk van Predictive Processing, 
stel ik een uitleg voor over het rekenmechanisme achter dit 
modelrevisieproces. 
Kortom, dit proefschrift bestaat uit vier studies waarin ik 
heb aangetoond dat zuigelingen, peuters en volwassenen hun 
bestaande interne modellen aanpassen aan veranderingen in 
de omgeving. Meer in het bijzonder passen ze hun interne 
modellen voortdurend aan om de nauwkeurigheid van de 
modellen in een dynamische omgeving te behouden, omdat 
er nieuwe waarnemingen gedaan worden. Verder heb ik 
laten zien dat deelnemers hun interne modellen herzien 
wanneer hun huidige wereldmodellen ontoereikend zijn 
om hun observaties te verklaren. Anders dan modelupdates, 
veranderden zij in dit geval de structuur van hun modellen, 
bijvoorbeeld door nieuwe variabelen aan de modellen toe te 
voegen.
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